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The Business Jud . ·ent Rule, Disclosure, and
Executive Compensation
D.A. Jeremy Telman·
Despite its ubiquity in corporate Jaw; the business judgment rule remains a doctrinal
puzzle. Both courts and scholars offer different unde1"St1mdings ofthe Rules role in litigation
brought against corporate directors and different justifications for its deployment to insulate
such directors livm liability for breaches of fiduciary duties. 11Jis Article rejects all existing
justifications for the Rule and argues that the Rule is no longer needed to protect directors fivm
liabilit}j either because the justifications offered never made any sense or because directors are
now protected by other, statufOJY means. Rather, the Rule is needed today not to protect
directors, but the corpomtions they serve fivm the i11eparable hann corporations would suffer if
forr:ed to disclose prospective business plans in order to defend decisions taken by their boards.
This Article follows some recent scholarship in arguing that the Rule is best undeJ'Stood as an
abstention doctrine and argues that cowts shouldinvoke the Rule and abstain fivm the reliew of
the business judgment ofcorporate directors when the litigation that gives rise to such rewew
would compel the corporation to disclose info1111ation relating to its prospective business plans.
The Article then Illustrates why the Rule should not apply in cases involving challenges to board
decisions relating to executive compensation through a detaJJed discussion of the ongoing
litigation relating to the hiring and dismissal ofthe Walt Disney Companys fo1111er Presiden~
Michael Ovitz.
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This Article contends that none of the conventional justifications
for the business judgment rule (Rule) are entirely satisfactory, because
the Rule is ordinarily defended as necessary to protect corporations'
directors from liability, and directors are already protected by other
means. Instead, this Article seeks to rethink the Rule as a means of
protecting corporations from irreparable harms caused by litigation.
This Article thus proposes that the Rule be aggressively conceived as a
doctrine of abstention, pursuant to which courts refrain from
substantive review of a board's decisions as long as the decisionmaking process was proper. However, this Article would limit
application of the Rule to cases where disclosure of the decisionmaking process involved in the challenged business decision would.
require disclosure of prospective business plans. In order to illustrate
one area where its proposal would make a difference in the deployment
of the Rule, the Article focuses on one case involving allegations that a
board breached its duty of c.are in connection with the approval of an
executive compensation package. Because decisions relating to
executive compensation generally do not involve prospective business
plans, the Rule should not apply to preclude substantive review of
board decisions relating to such compensation.
Part II of this Article points out the general weaknesses in the
leading justifications of the Rule. In Part ID.A, the Article proposes a
different justification for the Rule: the need to protect corporations
against disclosures of prospective business strategies underlying
corporate decision making. However, the Article contends that the
Rule should not protect corporations from disclosures in connection

2007]

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

831

with challenges to executive compensation. Finally, Part TII.B looks at
the suit brought by shareholders of the Walt Disney Company
(Disney), alleging breaches of fiduciary duties in connection with the
Disney board's decision to hire Michael Ovitz as the company's
president and then to pay hitn $140 million in severance upon his
termination after only fourteen months in office.•
IT.

WEAKNESSES IN 'I'HE DOCTRINAL EDIFICE

Pursuant to the Rule, courts generally defer to decisions taken by
2

corporate directors, whether they relate to mergers and acquisitions,
4
3
paying out of dividends, charitable donations, or executive
compensation/ as long as: (1) a business decision was made, (2) in
good faith, (3) after the director reasonably informed herself, and
1.
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The stockholder plaintiffs have alleged that the director
defendants breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the 1995 hiring and 1996
tennination of Michael Ovitz as President of The Walt Disney Company."). This Article was
conceived and written before the Delaware Supreme Court decision of June 8, 2006,
aftutning the judgment of the chancery court. In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27. This Article has
not been revised in light of the supreme court's decision, because the supreme court affirmed
not only the conclusion but also the reasoning of the chancery court.
2.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ('~[T]he
[Rule], including the standards by which director conduct is judged, is applicable in the
context of a takeover."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) ("While suit
might result from the rejection of a merger or tender offer, Delaware law makes clear that a
board acting within the ambit of the [Rule] faces no ultimate liability.").
3.
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (holding that, in
the absence of self-dealing, the business~judgment standard applies to a parent corporation's
decision to have its subsidiary declare dividends); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668,
682 (Mich. 1919) ('"It is a well-recognized principle of law that the directors of a
corporation, and they alone, have the power to declare a dividend of the earnings of the
corporation, and to determine its amount."' (quoting Hunter v. Roberts, Throp & Co., 47
N.W. 131, 134 (Mich. 1890))); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N'~Y.S.2d 807, 810 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct.), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("[T]he question of whether or not a
dividend is to be declared or a distribution of some kind should be made is exclusively a
matter of business judgment for the Board of Directors."); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d
692, 695 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947) (refusing to substitute the judgment of the court for that of the
corporation's board of directors as to whether dividends should be declared).
4.
See A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953) (sustaining a
corporation's charitable contribution to a privately supported educational institution where
there was no evidence that the contribution was made indiscriminately or in furtherance of
the personal objectives of corporate directors).
5.
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (noting that a board of
directors' business decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational
business purpose in upholding the board's approval of a large severance package for the
corporation's former president); In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 771 (finding that the former
Disney board properly exercised its business judgment and did not violate any fiduciary
duties when it elected Ovitz as president after being informed of who Ovitz was, the key
terms of his employment agreement, and the reporting structure to which Ovitz had agreed).
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(4) the director had no financial interest in the decision at issue.
Despite its ubiquity in the jurisprudence of corporate law, the Rule
7
remains a doctrinal puzzle. Scholars struggle towards a unified theory
to justify the Rule's multiple applications, but this leads to doctrinal
8
incoherence.
The most compelling explanation of how the Rule ought to be
9
conceptualized is the notion of the Rule as an abstention doctrine. So
conceived, the Rule cuts off litigation before the court engages in any
10
substantive review of the board's decision. As an abstention doctrine,
the Ru1e serves its fundamental purpose of protecting corporations
from the expense of suits that challenge decisions that are within the
purview of a corporation's board of directors.'' However, courts rarely

See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 51 VAND. L. REv. 83, 83 (2004) ("The [Rule] pervades every aspect of state
corporate law, from the review of allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing
transactions, to board decisions to seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.,');
Meredith M. Brown & William D. Regner, JWJats Happening to the Business Judgment
Rule?, INSIGHTS, Aug. 2003, at 2 ("Courts have traditionally deferred to the business
judgment of directors, if the directors act in good faith, with loyalty to the corporation, and on
an informed basis."); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence ofStandards ofConduct and
Standards ofReview in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 441 (1993) (setting forth
four conditions that must be met for the Rule to apply: (1) a judgment has been made, (2) the
director has employed a reasonable decision-making process, (3) the decision has been made
in subjective good faith, and (4) no fmancial conflicts of interest exist).
See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 279-88 (2000) (swnrnari7.
zing cases that range from treating the Rule as akin to an ordinary negligence standard to
cases that hold that the Rule precludes them from substantive review of business decisions);
Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 84 ("[D]espite all of the attention lavished on it, the [Rule]
remains poorly wtderstood.;'); R., Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the
Business Judgment Rule, 48 Bus. LAw~ 1337, 1337-40 (1993) (noting the lack of consensus
on the meaning of the [Rule]); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule:
Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 287, 287-88 (1994)
(remarking on the lack of consensus as to what the Rule really is).
8.
See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 84 ("We lack a coherent and unified theory
that explains why the rule exists and where its limits should be placed.''); Kenneth B. Davis,
Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 573, 573 ("[T]housands of
pages of corporate law scholarship . . . have been devoted to these fimdamental questions
[regarding the Rule], yet we remain short of any broad consensus as to the answers.").
9.
Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87 ("[T]he [R]ule is better understood as a doctrine
of abstention pursuant to which courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless
exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.").
10. See id at 128 ("If the [Rule] is framed as an abstention doctrine, however,
judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather than the rule.").
11. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 306 (stating that even if a defendant prevails in a
suit brought by shareholders, the litigation will be expensive); cf. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 265 (Del 2000) (stating that Disney's board had an argument for firing Ovitz for cause
but persuading the court to accept the argwnent would involve expensive litigation,
distraction of executive time and company resources, lost opportunity eosts, more bad

6.

.

.
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treat the Rule as an abstention doctrine, preferring to characterize it
12
either as an evidentiary guideline or a standard of review.
One major problem with cowts' use of the Rule is that the
justifications of the Rule now mostly focus on the need to protect the
interests of the corporate directors rather than on protecting the
interests of the corporation itself. Most legal scholars' discussions of
the justifications of the Rule similarly focus on why directors must
benefit from the Rule's protection rather than on why the Rule is
necessary to protect the interests of corporations and their
13
shareholders.
The following discussion aims to cut through the doctrinal
confusion that has arisen from courts' attempts to use the Rule to
protect directors rather than corporations. In Part II.A, this Article
illustrates how the Rule has been variously conceived as a presumption
and as a standard of review. If the Rule is so understood, courts
necessarily engage in substantive review of board decisions. In the
end, courts generally defer to those decisions but only after the
corporation has suffered the expense and reputational hanns associated
with protracted litigation. Thus, the Ru1e would better protect the
interests of corporations if more consistently applied as an abstention
doctrine. In Part II.B, this Article critiques existing justifications for
the Rule, all of which focus on the need to protect directors rather than
on the need to protect corporations. Concluding that all of these
justifications are unsatisfactory, the Article then introduces a new
substantive justification for the Rule: the Rule is necessary to protect
corporations only when the discovery process attendant to litigation
would compel the corporation to disclose its prospective business
plans.
A.

ConiiJsion as to the Nature ofthe Rule

Part of the difficulty that courts face in ,applying the Rule is that
there is no agreement as to what it is, except that all seem agreed that
14
the Rule is not a rule.. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme
publicity, and an outcome that was uncertain at best and, at worst, could have resulted in
damages against the company).
12. See discussion infta Part II.A.
13. See discussion iniTa Part II.B.l-2.
14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.; 907 A.2d 693, 746-47 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The [Rule] is not actually a substantive rule of law.~~.");
Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn't a Rule The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U.
L. REv. 631, 631 (2002) ("The much misWlderstood [Rule] is not a 'rule' at all.'').
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Court described the Rule essentially as an evidentiary presumption in
favor of directors, characterizing the Rule as
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish
15
. facts rebutting the presumption.

The presumption applies only when there is no evidence of fraud, bad
16
faith, or self-dealing on the part of the directors. When the plaintiff
fails to rebut the presumption, "she is not entitled to any remedy, be it
17
legal or equitable, unless the transaction constitutes waste." However,
although the Delaware Supreme Court repeatedly states that the Rule
18
is really an evidentiary presumption, the strength of the presumption
19
is unclear. Because a plaintiff always bears the evidentiary burden, it
.

15. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted); see Branson, supra note 14, at
632 ("Most generally, the [Rule] acts as a presumption in favor of corporate managers'
actions.''). The Aronson court relied on two earlier cases, Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d
119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971 ), and Robinson v. Pittsburgh 011 Refining Corp., 126 A. 46, 48 (Del.
Ch. 1924), in support of its interpretation of the Rule as a "preswnption." See Balotti &
Hanks, supra note 7, at 1341 ("The reader of these opinions is left with the suspicion that the
term presumption in the early opinions was introduced in its colloquial rather than its
evidentiary sense and then carried forward without further consideration."). But the
presumption approach to the Rule has also been adopted by other courts. Se~ e.g., Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981) ('''When [directors] act in good
faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business judgment, reposed in them as directors,
which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their
decisions.'" (quoting Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill.
1980))); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 E2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Under the [Rule],
directors are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith ...."); Johnson v. Trueblood,
629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[I]f actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the
corporation, then the directors are preswned to have been exercising their sound business
judgment ....''); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) ("The authority and
responsibilities vested in corporate directors both by statute and decisional law proceed on the
assumption that inescapably there can be no available obJective standard by which the
correctness of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise."); 1
DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE
DIRECTORS 22-24 (5th ed. 1998) (citing cases from twenty-five jurisdictions other than
Delaware where courts have treated the Rule as a presumption in favor of a board having
acted with due care).
16. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 747 (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del.
1988)).
17. ld
18. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supm note 15, at 20-21 (citing over twenty cases from the
Delaware Supreme Court reiterating its view that the Rule is a presumption).
19. See id at 25-32 (discussing the nature of the presumption and the effect on
litigation when that presumption is overcome); Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 13 78 (Del.
1996) ("Only by demonstrating that the Board breached its fiduciary duties may the
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is not clear how treating the Rule as a presumption adds an · g to
20
that burden.
Kenneth Davis defines the Rule quite lucidly as "a doctrine
holding that directors of corporations should not be liable for what
amounts to a good faith exercise of business judgment, even if other
21
conclusion.'' The Rule is thus a
boards might have reached a con
means of allocating the risk of business judgments to shareholders
22
rather than directors. This seems straightforward enough~ but once
again it is not clear how courts are to apply the Rule so understood. As
Davis sets-out the Rule, it could simply mean that boards will not be
liable for a good faith business decision, even if that decision has
disastrous consequences for the corporation, as long as the board's
decision was not a negligent one.
Confusion over the applicable standard is exacerbated because, as
Melvin Eisenberg points out, there is a divergence between the
standard of conduct (our expectations of directors) and the standard of
review that a court will apply in determining whether a board's
23
conduct gives rise to liability. In setting out the standard of care, the
Model Business Corporation Act of1998 states that directors, in using
their business judgment, are to exercise "the care an ordinarily prudent
24
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances."
presumption of the [Rule] be rebutted ...."). But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872-73 (Del. 1985} (requiring that plaintiffs establish the board acted with gross negligence
in order to rebut the Rule's presumption).
20.
See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 291-92 (arguing that the presumption is nothing
more than a burden of proof and noting that "the proposition that the plaintiff, in any context,
has the burden ofproving his or her prima facie case is a rule with which every frrst-year law
student should be familiar").
21. Davis, supmnote-8, at 573.
22. Id at 573-74.
23. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 467 (concluding that the standard of conduct for
directorS is that they must act in good faith and in the interests of the corporation, but
standards of review may be relaxed, intermediate, or demanding, depending on the nature of
the business judgment being reviewed); see 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 1-4 ("[T]he
duty of care requires that directors exercise the care that a person in a like position would
exercise Wlder similar circumstances . . . . The [Rule] is a standard of judicial review for
director conduct, not a standard of conduct.");.William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard
ofReview ofDirector Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Cntique ofVan Gorkom
and Its Progeny as a Standard ofReview Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449, 450-51 (2002)
(noting that in corporation law the standard of conduct and standard of review diverge in the
area of due care).
24. MODEL Bus. CORR Acr § 8.30(a)(2) (1998); see Branson, supra note- 14, at 631
("The standard of conduct is not 'slight care,' or 'gross negligence,' or anything other than
due care."). This standard.of care has been criticized as inappropriate given how boards work.
See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director~ Duty ofAttention:
Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1493 (1984).
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The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that the standard of care is
"that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would
25
use in similar circumstances." Few courts
have held directors liable
.
for breaches of this standard of care, but there is a considerable range
26
in the standard of review applied. Standards of review applied under
the Rule include "good faith, business judgment, prudence,
27
negligence, gross negligence, waste, and faimess." New York courts
28
have stated standards ranging from ordinary negligence to "good
faith,;' that is, directors will not be liable as long as they thought their
29
actions would benefit the company.
The Delaware courts also have not spoken with one voice when it
comes to determining which standard of review applies. While fonner
Chancellor William T. Allen contends that the proper standard is
30
''gross negligence," he concedes that courts do not seem to apply a
.

25.
26.

.

.

Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 295 (stating the dominant interpretation of the Rule is as
a standard of culpability but noting that "courts and commentators disagree on what the
standard is or should be").
27.
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 438. Eisenberg suggests that different standards of
review might be appropriate depending on whether the relief sought is the imposition of
liability on a director or merely injunctive relief. Id at 446. Scholarly arguments in support
of such a rationale for different standards under the Rule date back to at least 1984, but
Eisenberg can point to only "modest support" in case law for any link between the type of
relief sought and the standard applied. See id at 445-47 (''[I]t is not clear that the
employment of different standards of review in liability and validity contexts has caught hold
in the context of ordinary business decisions."); Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 290-94 (arguing that
treating the Rule as an ordinary negligence standard renders the Rule tautological).
28. Sec Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (N.Y; Sup~ Ct. 1940) ("Unless we are
to do away entirely with the doctrine that directors of a bank are liable for negligence in
administering its affairs liability should be imposed in connection with this transaction.;').
But see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Earnings Management and the Business Judgment Rule: :An
Essay on Recent Corporate Scandals, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1261, 1266 (2004)
(suggesting that the conduct at issue in Litwin actually involved gross negligence).
29.
See, e.g., Gewrtz, supra note 7, at 297 {citing New York cases using a bad faith
standard of review).
30. Allen et al., supra note 23, at 449. Allen and his coauthors criticize the Van
Gorkom decision for giving ''insufficient weight to the substantive policy judginents
underlying the gross negligence standard of review that governs whether corporate directors
should be foWld liable for breaching their duty of care." Id (criticizing Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1983)). Allen then praises the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), for holding that courts should review directors
adherence to their duty of care only for "irrationality," the functional equivalent of a gross
negligence standard. 1d at 457; see In rc Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,
748 (Del. Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (''[T]he appropriate standard for
determining liability is widely believed to be gross negligence, but a single Delaware case has
held that orditulf)' negligence would be the appropriate standard." (citing Rabkin v. Philip A.
Hunt Chern. Corp., 1987 WL 28436, at *1-3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (employing an
ordinary negligence standard) (footnotes omitted))).
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gross negligence standard of review consistently to duty-of-care cases
31
that implicate the Rule.
Stephen Bainbridge contends that treating the Rule as a standard
of review leads to erroneous decisions, and he therefore prefers to
conceptualize the rule as an abstention doctrine "pursuant to which
courts in fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting
32
preconditions for review are satisfied." Lyman Johnson has similarly
argued that the Rule is best understood as a "narrow-gauged policy of
33
non-review." Johnson thus proposes a "modest" Rule as follows:
'" [W]here money damages or equitable relief is sought, the [Rule] is a
judicial policy of not reviewing the substantive merits of a board of
directors' business decision for the purpose of detennining whether
34
directors breached or fulfilled their duty of due care."' Bainbridge
35
and Johnson's reading of the Rule would greatly expand its scope
because they would have courts abstain from engaging in substantive
review of board decisions where the directors can show that they had
no interest in the challenged transactions, did not conunit waste, and
36
followed appropriate decision-making procedures.

31. See Aronson v: Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1984) ("[D]irector liability is
predicated on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.''). But see Allen et
al., supra note 23, at 458-61 (decrying recent decisions such as Van Gorkom and Cede & Co.
v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), as improperly imposing liability on directors
based on a negligence standard).
32. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87.
33. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 Bus. LAW. 625, 625
(2000) (emphasis omitted).
34. Id at 631.
35. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 87 (noting that courts adopting the abstention
approach to the Rule would not review the substance of directors' decisions unless the
plaintiff can meet the ''very heavy burden of rebutting [the] preswnption" against review).
Johnson's approach to the Rule is similar. He argues that any breach of the duty to act with
due care is a breach of fiduciary duty that exposes the director to liability for all damages
proximately caused by the breach, absent statutory protections against such liability.
Johnson, supra note 33, at 634 (referencing DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 102{b)(7) (2001), which
allows corporationS to limit liability for any breach of the duty of care by its directors).
However, Johnson contends that the Rule precludes a court's substantive review of a board's
business decisions whether or not the duty of care was violated. Id at 634-35. Like
Bainbridge, Johnson criticizes the Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Cede & Co., 634
A.2d 345, and Cinemma, Inc. ~ Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995), for engaging in
substantive review of the board's decisions as part of an inquiry into the board's exercise of
due care. Id at 645-50.
36. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 128 (contending that courts should review facts
not to detennine the quality of the decision or whether the board exercised reasonable care
but whether the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing, fraud, or illegality).
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However, courts have conceived the Rule as a form of abstention
37
doctrine in a relatively small number of prominent cases. When they
do so, courts justify abstention in tertns of the standard defenses of the
Rule, explored in Part ll.B. In Shlensky v. Wngley, the court relied on
the "sovereignty rationale," contending that because directors are
chosen to make business judgments, their decisions cannot be
38
challenged unless tainted by fraud.
In refusing to review Henry
Ford's decision to expand his company's manufacturing facilities in
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the court noted that ')udges are not business
39
experts," another common justification for the Rule. Conceiving the
Rule as an abstention doctrine, rather than as a standard or review or a
presumption, thus has some support in the case law and also makes
sense in terms of the standard justifications of the Ru1e, but it is not the
40
dominant approach of the courts.
Given the doctrinal confusion regarding the nature of the Rule, it
is not surprising that courts do not apply the Rule consistently. But
one reason there is no agreement on what standard of review the Rule
establishes is that the Rule is deployed in too many diverse contexts,
and it would be inappropriate to apply the same standard of review in

37. Cf. id at 95-102 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), and
criticizing the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 345, for
engaging in substantive review of the board's decision-making process to deterntine whether
it violated its duty of care); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Dodge
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y.
1888); Kamin v~ Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'~ 387 N.Y.S.2d 993
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
38. 237 N.E.2d.at 778-80.
39. 170 N.W. at 684. The same rationale was also deployed when the Kamin court
stated that "[t]he directors' room rather than the courtroom is the appropriate forum for
thrashing out purely business questions." 383 N. Y.S.2d at 810-11.
40. The American Law Institute (ALI) takes a complementary approach in its
Principles of Co1porate Govemance;· Analysis and Recommendations, in which it
characterizes the Rule as establishing a "safe harbor'' for directors accused of breaching their
duty of care if they: (1) are disinterested, (2) are reasonably infonned with respect to the
challenged business judgment, and (3) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best
interests of the corporation. 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS§ 4.0l(c) (1992); see, e.g., Branson, supra note 14, at 636 ("By contrast
(with the Delaware formulation of the Rule], the ALI version is a safe harbor."); Balotti &
Hanks, supra note 7, at 1338-39 ("[I]n the ... ALI, there is a [Rule], labelled a 'safe harbor,'
the satisfaction of which is a complete defense to an alleged breach of the standard of conduct
...."). This safe-harbor approach would seem to be equivalent in its effects to the notion of
the Rule as an abstention doctrine: assuming the board followed the proper decision-making
procedures and acted in good faith, a court should abstain from review of the substance of
board decisions.
.
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all cases. This Article takes a closer look at the sorts of decisions that
are protected by the Rule and provides a general theory that can
explain when boards should be accorded the Ru1e's protection and
when the sbareholding public is entitled to hold directors to a standard
of culpability more in line with their expectations for conduct by
business decision makers.
Conceiving the Rule as an abstention doctrine has the advantage
of providing for a more principled deployment of the Rule, as
abstention shuts down the litigation at a very early stage and thus
protects corporations from dissipation of resources and reputational
harm that could arise in the discovery process. However, this Article
proposes that such protections are only appropriate when the
challenged decisions relate to the corporation's prospective business
plans, the disclosure of which would interfere with the corporation's
ability to pursue such plans and thus do irreparable harm to the firm
and its shareholders.

B

Justifications for the Rule

Courts and legal scholars rely on three kinds of justification for
the Rule. First, courts defer to the judgment of corporate boards based
on their superior expertise and knowledge in business matters
42
generally and in the affairs of their businesses in particular. We trust
the institutional competence of corporate boards over that of courts
43
when it comes to the boards' business decisions.
In addition,
concerns regarding judicial economy and the overburdened courts
speak in favor of keeping challenges to c~rporate boards' decisions out
of the courts. A second justification for the [Rule] is that corporate
44

41. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 437-38 (arguing that courts have applied and
should apply different standards of review depending on the nature of the alleged breach by
directors).
42.. See, e.g., FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1517 (11th Cir. 1996) ("'(D]irectors are, in
most cases, more qualified to make business decisions than are judges.,.;, (quoting Int 'I Ins.
Co. v~ Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989))); Dodge, 110 N.W at 684 (refusing
to interfere with Henry Ford's plan to invest Ford's surplus capital in a new manufacturing
plant on the ground that "judges are not business experts").
43. See W. Point-Pepperell, lrtc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
S'holders Litig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) ('"Because businessmen and women are
correctly perceived as possessing skills, infonnation and judgment not possessed by
reviewing courts[,] . . . [the] courts have long been reluctant to second-guess [boards'
business] decisions when they appear to have been made in good faith."' (quoting Solash v.
Telex Corp., 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988))).
44. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 14, at 637-38 f'(A] policy behind the rule is
conservation of the judicial resource. The [Rule] is a filter that enables courts to easily screen
out non-meritorious challenges to the actions of directors and executives.").
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executives would be less inclined to take risks in pursuing aggressive
strategies that promote economic growth if they could be held
personally liable every time a court, ruling in hindsight, considered
45
those strategies ill-advised.
Finally, the Rule is also defended based on a freedom-ofcontract/corporate-democracy theory, according to which shareholders
46
agree to delegate decision-making power to corporate boards. In the
interests of protecting the financial resources of the corporation from
dissipation in litigation, the decisions of a corporate board are subject
to judicial review only in limited cases involving fraud, self-dealing, or
47
decisions so egregious they can only be characterized as waste.

45. See; e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting that "potential
profit often corresponds to the potential risk" and recognizing the dangers of hindsight bias).
Chancellor Allen and his, coauthors break down these first two justification of the Rule as
follows:
(I) [D]irectors must often make decisions in an environment of imperfect (that is,
limited or incomplete) information; (2) the risk of liability under the applicable
standard of conduct for assuming a given corporate role may dwarf the incentives
for assuming the role; (3) if the risk of liability is disproportionate to the directors'
incentives for service, directors may avoid making economically valuable decisions
that might subject them to litigation risk; (4) courts are ill-equipped to determine
after the fact whether a particular business decision was reasonable in the
circumstances confronting the corporation; and (5) institutional and prudential
considerations sometimes counsel judicial deference to the corporate decision
maker.
Allen et al., supra note 23, at 451-52; see Frances T. v. Viii. Green Owners Ass'n, 723 P.2d
573, 582 n.l4 (Cal. 1986) ("[D]irectors should be given wide latitude in their handling of
corporate affairs because the hindsight of the judicial process is an imperfect device for
evaluating business decisions.").
46.
See Allen et al., supra note 23, at 456 ("Directors are elected, and can be removed,
by shareholders. Where stockholders are able to change the board because of inadequate
performance, there is less reason for courts to intervene and police whether the directors are
behaving reasonably.").
47. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 46 (2004) (noting cases in which actual
waste is found have been described as akin to the Loch Ness Monster "so rare as to be
possibly nonexistent"); see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748 (Del.
Ch. 2005), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("Corporate waste is very rarely found in Delaware
courts because the applicable test imposes such an onerous burden upon a plaintiff . ...");
Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at • 5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)
("There surely are cases of fraud; of unfair self-dealing and, much more rarely negligence.
But rarest of all and indeed, like Nessie, possibly non-existent would be the case of
disinterested business people making non-fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the
legal standard of waste!"). The Brehm court describes the test for waste as "stringent;' that is,
"'an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration."' Brehln v. Eisner; 746
A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (quoting In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 748).
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None of these defenses of the Rule is satisfying.
The
justifications are unconvincing because we do not protect similarly
situated decision makers with similar common law rules of
48
deference. In addition, the justifications fail to the extent that they
explain the Rule in terms of the need to protect directors who are
49
already sheltered from liability through statutory means. But most of
all, these justifications fail because they focus on the need to protect
directors rather than on the need to protect the vital interests of the
corporation against litigation threats that are unlikely to further those
interests.
1.

Deference to Boards' Business Expertise

The cases are legion in which courts proclaim the virtues of the
Rule in allocating responsibility for business decisions to professional
businessmen rather than to judges whose area of expertise is law.5° But
legal scholars have pointed out several weaknesses in this justification
for the Rule. For one thing, judges are often called upon to rule in
51
cases involving factual scenarios that require professional expertise.
But courts do not routinely defer to the medical judgment of doctors or

48. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 305, 312-14 (arguing that the decisions made by
business directors do not deserve any more deference than medical or legal decisions, which
also require the decision maker to take risks or which might result in a loss).
49. See infra Part ll.B.2.
50. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (supporting the
Rule on the ground it prevents courts from becoming enmeshed in complex decision-making
processes that they are ill-equipped to handle); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684
(Mich. 1919) (refusing to question Ford's decision to expand its manufacturing facilities on
the ground that ')udges are not business experts"); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) ("'[I]t is not [the court's] function to resolve for corporations questions of
policy and business management. The directors are chosen to pass upon such questions and
their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final."' (quoting Davis v.
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (DeL Ch. 1928) (emphasis omitted))). For a
novel scholarly defense of this rationale, see Manning, supra note 24, at 1491 (contending
that the linear reasoning characteristic of legal thought is not well suited to business decision
making).
51. See Davis, supra note 8, at 581 ("Can anyone seriously argue that surgeons in the
operating room, lawyers in the midst of a heated trial, or accountants up against a closing
deadline are not also called upon to make snap judgments in response to circumstances that
may be difficult to recreate in a courtroom years later? Nonetheless, our legal system is quite
comfortable relying on the device of litigation to review ... the quality of these professionals'
performances ...."); Kent Greenfield & John E. Nilsson, Gradgnnds Education: Using
Dickens andAristotle to Understand (and Replace?) the Business Judgment Rule, 63 BROOK.
L. REv. 799, 825-26 (1997) (characterizing the justification as "disingenuous"); Dale A.
Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L.
REv. 485, 572 (1994) (dismissing the rationale as an "old adage").
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the engineering expertise of product designers. Instead, they rely on
3
expert testimony. 5 There is no reason why, aided by expert witnesses,
courts could not apply the same standard of liability to business
decision makers as they do to decision makers in other fields requiring
professional expertise.
Moreover, as one cotnmentator has noted, "[D]irectors, at least
the outside directors, bring to the table no particular business expertise
or experience, but instead general qualities such as common sense,
integrity, and a track record of accomplishment. These are, not
surprisingly, the same qualities that characterize most members of the
54
judiciary." If anything, the expertise of businessmen poses fewer
challenges for courts than does the expertise of other professionals
who do not enjoy the special protections accorded by the Rule.
Indeed, it may be true as a general rule that judges are less
qualified than professional businessmen to evaluate substantive
55
business decisions taken by a corporate board. However, there is no
reason to think that the general rule should be maintained in
jurisdictions such as Delaware and the New York .state Supreme
Court's Commercial Division in which the judges have remarkable and
56
varied commercial expertise. As more states set up conunercial
52. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 288 ("[T]he standards of ordinary negligence
sufficient to create liability for automobile drivers, doctors, lawyers, and just about anyone
else except children are not sufficient in an action on behalf of the corporation against its
directors."). Gevurtz provides a more extended argwnent for why the ordinary negligence
standard could apply to business decisions just as it does to other decisions made by
professionals. ld at 305-12.
53. Davis, supra note 8, at 581; see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 94 (1991) ("The standard justifications ...
do not explain why the same judges who decide whether engineers have designed the
compressors on jet engines properly, whether the fanner delivered pomegranates confot ming
to the industry's specifications, and whether the prison system adversely affects the mental
states of prisoners cannot decide whether a manager negligently failed to sack a subordinate
who made improvident loans."); Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v.
the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REv. 587, 613-17
( 1994) (highlighting differences between cases in the areas in medical malpractice and
corporate law).
54. Davis, supra note 8, at 581 (footnote omitted).
55. See FDIC v. Stahl, 89 F.3d 1510, 1517 {lith Cir. 1996) (noting that directors are
usually more qualified than judges to make business decisions).
56. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indetenninacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1925 (1998) (noting the Delaware Court of
Chancery's experience in corporate adjudication and reputation for proficiency in corporate
matters); see also ABA Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More
Efficient Judiciary, 52 Bus. LAW. 947, 955-56 (1997) (stating that the skilled judges and
efficiency of Delaware's Court of Chancery are often credited with spawning the push for
business courts elsewhere); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Tn'vial?: A Political and
Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 590 (1990) ("Delaware's governor, mindful of the
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courts presided over by judges with special business expertise, this
7
justification of the Rule looks more and more archaic. 5
Oddly enough, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel defend the
Rule based on the fact that the discovery process often provides judges
with more-infortnation about challenged decisions than the directors
58
actually had at the time the challenged decisions were made. The
Rule thus prevents judges with a more complete picture of the
circumstances from faulting directors for a hastily made d~cision.
But the Rule is a rather extreme way to address the_ problem of
hindsight bias. Indeed, courts already seem well aware of the danger
60
of hindsight bias. In short, this rationale for the Rule is rather hard to
defend in the very jurisdictions that have done the most to help
develop it.
Finally, this justification for the Rule is especially misplaced
when boards of directors rely on expert opinions in making their
business decisions, as they are permitted to do, for example, under
61
Delaware law. When boards rely on expert opinions, they concede
59

value of corporate charters, often deliberately appoints judges with corporate experience.'');
William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chmcery 1792-1992, 18 DEL~ J. CORP. L. 819,841-65 (1993) (outlining the Delaware Court
of Chancery's history and development from 1910 until present day in light of the advent of
corporate litigation); Larry Smith, All Systems Go: New lfJrk Business Courts Celebmte a
First Anniversary, INSIDE LITIG., Jan. 1997, at 1, 1-2 (stating that New York's Commercial
Division is the forum of choice for commercial litigation because of its management and
judicial expertise, while general court system judges neither enjoy nor understand the issues
of complex commercial litigation).
57. See Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History _of the Creation and
Junsdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 Bus. LAW. 147~ 151-52 (2004)
(discussing the potential creation and jurisdiction of business courts in Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).
58. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 100 (''Judges also are
accustomed to deciding_cases on full records and may be too quick to blame managers who
act as often they should in haste or on incomplete infom1ation.").
59. Jd
60. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (DeL Ch. 1998),
aff'd in part, revtl in part, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) ("It is the essence of the
[Rule] that a court will not apply 20/20 hindsight to second guess a board's decision, except
'in rare cases [where] a transaction may be so egregious_on its face that board approval
cannot meet the test of business judgment."' (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815
(Del. 1984))).
61. DEL. CODE., ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (e) (200 1) ("A member of the board of directors ...
shall . . . be fully protected in relying in good faith upon . . . such information, opinions,
reports or statements presented to the corporation by ... any other person as to matters the
member reasonably believes are within such other person's professional or expert competence
.. .. ."); see Brehm v.-Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,-261 (Del. 2000) ("The Old Board [was] entitled to
the presumption that it exercised proper business judgment, including proper reliance on the
expert.'' (footnote omitted)).
.
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that they lack expertise relevant to the business judgment in question.
Once they have had the opportunity to read the relevant experts'
reports and to hear testimony from qualified witnesses, judges are as
well-qualified as directors to assess the quality of boards' decisions on
matters in which those boards relied on expert opinions.
•

2.

.-

The Need To Protect Entrepreneurial Risk Takers

The American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of Corporate
Governance provides as the main justification of the Rule the need "to
protect directors and officers from the risks inherent in hindsight
reviews of their unsuccessful decisions, and to avoid the risk of stifling
2
innovation and venturesome business activity.',6 Numerous courts
have similarly recognized the need to shield directors from liability for
63
the risky ventures necessary for commercial development. Scholars
and courts have expressed concern that qualified businesspeople
would refuse to serve on boards if their risky decisions were not
62.
1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 40, § 4.01 cmt. d. Whether the Rule protects both officers and directors or only
directors is hotly contested among scholars and in the courts today. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
Co1porate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAW. 439, 440 (2005) ("[The
Rule]. does not and should not be extended to corporate officers in the same broad manner in
which it is applied to directors."). The issue is at the heart of plaintiffs' efforts to hold certain
Disney directors liable as officers when they acted in their capacities as corporate officers of
Disney in connection with the Ovitz litigation. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 36, In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (No. 411, 2005), 2005 WL
2777912 ("[T]he [Rule] does not apply to Eisner or Litvack acting as officers or to Russell
acting as Eisner's personal 'gratuitous agent."'); Answering Brief of Non-Ovitz DefendantsBelow, Appellees at 55, In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27 (No. 411, 2005), 2005 WL 3452042
(arguing that both numerous dicta and strong policy considerations suggest that the Rule
should apply to both officers and directors). The Delaware Supreme Court refused to address
the issue in the Disney litigation, finding that it was procedurally barred. In re Disney, 906
A.2d at 46 n.38.
63. See, e.g., 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 12-13 (citing cases); Joy v. North, 692
E2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds to the potential
risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly
cautious corporate decisions."); Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del.
Ch. 1996) ("Shareholders don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse.
Shareholders' investment interests ... will be maximized if corporate directors and managers
honestly assess risk and reward and accept for the corporation the highest risk adjusted
returns available that are above the fmn 's cost of capital."); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 ("Should the Court apportion
liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions taken in good faith by faithful directors
or officers, those decision-makers would necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, not
maximize value."); see also Allen et al., supra note 23, at 449 ("[D]eference [to business
decisions] furthers important public policy values and underscores the social utility of
encouraging corporate directors to make decisions that may create corporate wealth but that
are also risky.").
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64

protected by the Rule. Or, even if they agreed to serve on boards,
65
they would become risk averse and investors would suffer.
However, empirical evidence to support this concern is lacking.
While corporate directors recently have had to dig into their own
pockets to pay da111ages in connection with the spectacular collapses of
66
Enron and WorldCom, those cases involved criminal wrongdoing and
See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Ill.
1989), aff'd, 897 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The [Rule] encourages competent individuals to
64.

become directors who otherwise might decline for fear of personal liability."); Allen et al.,
supra note 23, at 449 ("Highly qualified directors may also avoid service if they face liability
risks that are disproportionate to the benefits of service."); Davis, supra note 8, at 574 ("Why
would directors enter into [risky business] ventures if they might be called upon to Wlderwrite
some of the losses arising from unfortunate outcomes while the profits from fortunate
outcomes flow to the shareholders?"); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 437-38 ("Perhaps standards
of conduct and standards of review in corporate law would always be identical in a world in
which information was perfect, the risk of liability for assuming a given corporate role was
always commensurate with the incentives for asswning the role, and institutional
considerations never required deference to a corporate organ. In the real world, however,
these conditions seldom hold ....").
65. Chancellor Allen articulated this concern most colorfully:
Corporate directors of public companies typically have a very small
proportionate ownership interest in their corporations and little or no incentive
compensation. Thus, they enjoy (as residual owners) only a very small proportion
of any ''upside" gains earned by the corporation on risky investment projects. If,
however, corporate directors were to be found liable for a corporate loss from a
risky project on the ground that the investment was too risky (foolishly risky!
stupidly risky! egregiously risky! you supply the adverb), their liability would be
joint and several for the whole loss (with I suppose a right of contribution). Given
the scale of operation of modern public corporations, this stupefying disjunction
between risk and reward for corporate directors threatens undesirable effects.
Given this disjunction, only a very small probability of director liability based on
"negligence", "inattention", "waste", etc., could induce a board to avoid
authorizing risky investment projects to any extent! Obviously, it is in the
shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors from
liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a practical
matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal
proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a business
loss.
Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052.
66.
See, e.g., Stephanie Armour, Enron Woes Reverberate Through Lives: Many Saw
Retirement Plans Evaporate with Stock Pnce, USA TODAY (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 26, 2006, at
1B (noting the $85 million settlement with certain Enron officers, directors, and
administrative committee members); G. Jeffrey MacDonald, Now, Execs Pay for Firms Sins,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Boston), Jan. 31, 2005, at 14 (noting the former WorldCom Inc.
directors personally agreed to pay $18 million as part of a $54 million settlement with
shareholders and ten former Enron directors agreed to pay $13 million of their own money as
part of a $168 million settlement with shareholders); Gretchen Morgenson, Sticky Scandals,
Teflon Directors, N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3, at 1 (''A year ago, 10 Enron directors,
including eight outside directors, agreed to pay $13 million out of their own pockets to
shareholders without admitting or denying any liability.").
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67

are hardly representative.
Awards against negligent directors (as
opposed to directors who are wholly inattentive or engaged in
interested transactions in breach of their duty of loyalty and who thus
would not be entitled to the Rule's protections) are actually
68
exceedingly rare.
It may be that the Rule is the proper mechanism for preventing
such awards and that it is necessary to encourage desirable risk-taking
69
activities by corporate managers.
However, it is not clear that
anything more than a negligence standard is needed to protect
entrepreneurial risk taking. As Franklin Gevurtz has pointed out:
Spinning off from Judge Hand's famous formula, if the magnitude of
gain expected from a board decision, multiplied by the probability
measured ex ante of achieving the gain, exceeds the magnitude of loss
risked by the decision, multiplied by the probability of the loss, than the
decision presumably is reasonable. Accordingly, a negligence standard
should neither deter the taking of desirable risks nor punish simply bad
70
results.
If the aim is promoting reasonable risk taking, a simple negligence
standard should suffice. Indeed, a more lenient standard creates a
moral hazard, as directors can engage in high-risk ventures with
shareholders' funds and without adequate risk of personal liability.
Moreover, legislators have created and/or pennitted numerous
alternative means of protecting directors from liability for their
business decisions. For example, after the Delaware Supreme Court's
67.
See, e.g., Mary Flood, Opposing Enron Legal Teams on Parallel Paths: Defense
We1ghs Open-Ended Mandate and Scope ofTask Force, Finds It Wanting, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Dec. 19, 2004, at Dl (noting Enron's fonner chief executive officer, Jeff Skilling, and exChainrian, Ken Lay, were indicted on multiple fraud and conspiracy charges); Leon Lazaroff,
Ex-JYco Chief, Top Lieutenant Found Gw1ty, Cm. TruB., June 18,2005, at 1 (mentioning the
conviction of Bernard J. Ebbers, fonner chainnan of WorldCom Inc., on charges of
engineering an $11 billion fraud); Phyllis Messinger et al., 10 Enron Players: Mlere They
LandedARer the Fall, N.Y. TlMES, Jan. 29,2006, § 3, at 8 (summarizing legal resolutions and
post-Enron careers of ten leading figures in the Enron scandal).
68. Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 313.
69. As Chancellor Chandler recently put it:
Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions
taken in good faith by faithful directors or officers, those decision-makers would
necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value. The entire
advantage of the risk-taking, innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the
Delaware corporation would cease to exist, with disastrous results for shareholders
and society alike.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006).
70. Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 305-06 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (footnotes omitted)).
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decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, Delaware amended its
Corporations Law to permit corporations to stipulate in their bylaws
that directors will not be liable for damages for breach of the duty of
72
care. According to the Delaware Supreme Court,
[t]he purpose of [the amendment] was to pennit shareholders who are
entitled to rely upon directors to discharge their fiduciary duties at all
times to adopt a provision in the certificate of incorporation to
exculpate directors from any personal liability for the payment of
monetary damages for breaches of their duty of care, but not for duty of
73
loyalty violations, good faith violations and certain other conduct.
74

Other states passed similar statutes, most of which provide
75
exculpation even in cases of gross negligence. Some states have
passed statutes permitting directors to consider the concerns of
constituencies other than shareholders but not shielding directors from
76
liability for breaches of the duty of care.
71. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
72. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) {2001); see, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin,
787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (noting that section 102(b)(7) was passed following the Van
Gorkom decision).
73. Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at 90 (emphasis omitted); see Prod. Res. Group,
L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 777 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("One of the primary
purposes of § l02(b)(7) is to encourage directors to undertake risky, but potentially value~"'o....J·
ing, business strategies, so long as they do so in good faith.").
74. Arkes & Schipani, supra note 53, at 617 ("Forty-six jurisdictions have enacted
legislation which pennits corporations to relieve directors from personal monetary liability to
the corporation and its shareholders for breach of the fiduciary duty of care."); see, e.g., CAL.
CoRP. CODE § 204(aXIO) (West 1990) (permitting provisions in a corporation's articles of
incorporation eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director for monetary damages
in an action brought by or in the name of the corporation for breach of a director's duties to
the corporation and its shareholders, except for acts or omissions in breach of the duty of
loyalty, in bad faith, or constituting intentional misconduct); 805 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2.10(b)(3) (West 2004) (allowing for a provision in a corporation's articles of incorporation
that eliminates or limits the personal liability of directors to the corporation or its
shareholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director except for any
breach of the director's duty of loyalty, for acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law, or for participating in interested
transactions); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 402(b) (McKinney 2003) (pennitting certificates of
incorporation to eliminate or limit personal liability for directors to the corporation or its
shareholders for breaches of duty unless the breach is a product of bad faith, intentional
misconduct, knowing violation of the law, or self-interested conduct).
75. Arkes & Schipani, supra note 53, at 617; sec, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-l-35l{e)(2) (LexisNexis 1999) (stating that a director is not liable for any action taken as a
director, or any failure to take action, unless "[t]he breach or failure to perfonn constitutes
willful misconduct or recklessness"); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2006) (limiting directors
liability for money damages except in cases of willful misconduct or knowing violations of
law).
76. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West 2004) (pennitting the
corporation's board to consider other stakeholders); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-1(2) (West 2003)
......
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Similarly, Delaware law permits corporations to indemnify their
officers and directors, as well as other employees and agents, against
77
liability in civil or criminal actions. Indemnification is mandatory
under Delaware law where the officer or director incurs costs in
connection with legal actions in which the officer or director "has been
78
successful on the merits or otheiWise." Such indemnification is
mandated even if the corporation pays tv settle a suit that results from
79
the officer's or director's bad faith misconduct. Some states permit
very broad indemnification, even if the result is that a corporation has
to pay damages to itself on behalf of a director in the context of
8
shareholder derivative litigation. ° Finally, on top of protection from
liability and indemnification, corporations may pay to insure their
officers and directors against any liability that is beyond the scope of
statutorily created powers of indemnification or protection from
81
liability. Such insurance can be quite broad and will be upheld as
82
long as it is not contrary to public policy.

(same); Omo RE~ CODE ANN.§ 1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2004) (same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN.§ 1715(a)(l) (West 1995) (same).
77. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)-(b).
78_. Id tit. 8, § 145(c).
79. See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F. 3d 87, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1996)
(requiring indemnification under § 145(c) for litigation costs incurred by Waltuch in a suit
that the company settled by paying $35 million to investors who alleged that Waltuch had
engaged in fraud, market manipulation, and antitrust violations).
80.
See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 722(c) (McKinney 2003). Section 722(c) provides:
A corporation may indemnify any person made, or threatened to be made, a
party to an action by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its
favor by reason of the fact that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director or
officer of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a
director or officer of any other corporation ....
See also IND. CODE. ANN.§ 23-1-37-S(a) ("A corporation may indemnify an individual made
a party to a proceeding because the individual is or was a director against, liability il).c~ed in
the proceeding ... ~"). "[A]uthorization of indemnification for 'liabilities incurred in a
proceeding' is broader than the comparable GCA provision, which permitted indemnification
for 'expenses' only." Id § 23-1-3 7-8 cmt. a.
81. See DEL,. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g).
82. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 1985-87 (noting that most directors and
officers' insurance policies will not cover willful or felonious conduct and that at least one
court has found that insurance against reckless conduct violates public policy); EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 105 (defending insurance and indemnification schemes as
allowing firms to contract around liability rules when markets are cheaper than courts and
noting that these schemes are enforced "almost without exception"); Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991)
("Policies routinely exempt losses from adjudication of dishonesty, but if a claim is settled,
courts prohibit insurers from seeking an adjudication of guilt and thereby avoiding the claim's
payment. Similarly, while all policies exclude losses involving personal profit, if a suit
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In addition, state legislatures have adopted procedural rules to
83
deter suits against corporate directors. The statutes, modeled on the
Revised Model Business Co1poration Act; require that a plaintiff post
security for the corporation's expenses atld attorneys' fees to be
incurred in coiUlection with the suit, unless the plaintiff is a significant
shareholder (usually holding over 5% of outstanding shares or $25,000
84
worth of the defendant corporation's stock). Such a security is not
req11ired either in Delaware or under the Federal Rules of Civil
85
Procedure. A number of explanations are offered for Delaware's
refusal to pass such statutes: they discourage meritorious suits; they
discriminate against minority shareholders; they are easily
circumvented; and they are not necessary to protect corpomtions from
86
meritless suits, especially-as other means are available. The fact that
fourteen jurisdictions have nonetheless passed legislation granting
corporations these additional protections suggests the len · to ·which
87
legislatures have gone to protect directors from potentialliability.
All of this legislation arose long after the Rule was already in
88
place. In short, if the Rule is intended to protect corporate decision
alleging breach of both the duty of care and loyalty is settled, the insurer is required to cover
. . . . .~') .
. cIaun
the entrre
83. See, e.g., Shiro Kawashima & Susumu Sakurai, Shareholder Derivative Litigation
in Japan: Law, Practice, and Suggested Refo1n1S, 33 STAN. J. INT'L L. 9, 44 ( 1997) (noting at
least fourteen states allow corporations to require plaintiffs to post security for expenses in
derivative suits); see also DEBORAH A. DEMOIT, SHAREHOLDER DERJVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW
AND PRAcncE § 3.1 (2006) (stating sixteen states that require the posting of a bond).
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-714(c)(4) (2001) ("[T]he court shall fiX the nature
and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff for reasonable expenses, including
attorneys, fees, which may be incurred by the moving party and the corporation in connection
with such action, including, but without limiting, the foregoing expenses for which the
corporation may become liable pursuant to § 4-26-814."); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 800(c)(l)(2)(d) (West 1990) (indicating that a corporation or defendant may seek a bond up to $50,000
in a shareholder derivative suit- if ( 1) there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of
the cause will benefit the corporation or its shareholders, or (2) the moving party~ if not the
corporation, did not participate in the complained of transaction); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627
(McKinney 2003) (stating a corporation can require shareholders bringing a derivative suit to
give security if their holdings are less than 5% of the outstanding shares and are valued ~t less
than $50,000).
85. Kawashima & Sakurai, supra note 83, at 44.
86. Jd at 4445. Kawashima and Sakurai suggest that sanctioning attorneys who
bring meritless suits is a better means of deterring strike suits. Jd at 45 n.312. This seems
unlikely, however, as moving for attorney sanctions merely adds a new layer of litigation to
the corporation's burden.
87. Jd at 44.
88. See l BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 9-11 (tracing the history of the Rule, noting
its inception in England in 1742 and its development within American jurisprudence
beginning in 1829); Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 287 ("[T]he rule, in one fonn or another,
extends back through 160 years ofjudicial decisions.").
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makers from the kind of exposure to liability that might make them
risk averse, they seem to be more than adequately protected, even
absent the Rule. If the Rule was once necessary to protect directors
from liability for violations of their duty of care, statutory
developments have rendered that aim obsolete.
3.

The Sovereignty Rationale

In this Subpart, I will discuss two different versions of what
89
Davis has tenned the "sovereignty rationale" for the Rule.
The
weaker, but more generally accepted, formulation of the sovereignty
rationale acknowledges that corporations ought to be run in the
interests of shareholders, but argues that because directors are elected
by shareholders, the shareholders should hold them accountable
through the mechanisms of corporate democracy rather than through
90
litigation. "Where stockholders are able to change the board because
of inadequate performance, there is less reason for courts to intervene
91
and police whether the directors are behaving reasonably."
This
would be persuasive if the mechanisms for corporate accountability
made corporate executives somewhat responsive to shareholder
concerns. For the reasons given below, they do not, and thus the weak
92
version of the sovereignty rationale is unconvincing.
The stronger version of the sovereignty rationale is the doctrine
of director primacy, which rejects the notion that shareholders have the
93
right to control the corporations they own.
CoWltering both the
Davis, supra note 8, at 587 (citing DEL. CooEANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (directives that
the corporation's affairs be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors)).
90. See 1 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 15, at 17 ("[T]he [Rule] ensures that directors
rather than shareholders manage corporations."); Brown & Regner, supra note 6, at 2
("Courts are mindful that shareholders have elected the directors, not the courts, to supervise
the affairs of the corporations they own.").
91.
Allen et al., supra note 23, at 456; see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907
A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), atrd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The redress for failures that
arise from faithful management must come from the markets, through the action of
shareholders and the free flow of capital, and not from this Court."); Barnes v. Andrews, 298
F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) ("Must a director guarantee that his judgment is good? Can
shareholders call him to account for deficiencies which their votes assured him did not
disqualify him for his office? While he may not have been the Cromwell for that Civil War,
Andrews did not engage to play any such role.").
92.
See infm Part II.B.3.a.
93. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547,550-51 (2003) ("Shareholders do not own the
corporation and, accordingly, directors are not stewards of shareholder wealth. Shareholders
are simply a group of participants bound together by a web of voluntary agreements whose
nexus the law treats as a finn.''). Bainbridge notes, however, that though shareholders do not
control corporations, they are the beneficiaries of the board's fiduciary duties under the
89.
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shareholder-primacy doctrine and managerialism, the directorprimacy doctrine contends that "[n]either shareholders nor managers
95
control corporations boards of directors do." The director-primacy
doctrine sides with shareholders as opposed to other ''stakeholders'' in
the corporation as it "embraces the shareholder wealth maximization
96
norm even as it rejects the theory of shareholder primacy." However,
the director-primacy doctrine rejects the notion that directors exercise
97
powers over corporate matters only as agents of the shareholders.
a.

The Weak Sovereignty Rationale: Corporate Democracy

The only way to justify permitting directors to make business
decisions with shareholders' capital is if the shareholders have agreed
to place responsibility for such decisions in the hands of management
On first glance, it seems obvious that they have done so, either based
on a theory of corporate democracy or based on simple contract law.
Either shareholders have consented to the delegation of decisionmaking authority to the board through elections of the board's
members or, by purchasing shares in a corporation, they have

director-primacy doctrine. Id at 550; see Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate
Gove.mance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 462-63 (1992) (criticizing the ALI Governance Project for
adopting a "responsibility moder' rather than the "authority model'' of corporate governance
which Dooley believes to be 'the prevailing judicial and statutory precedent").
94. Managerialism has its origins in the classic work of ADoLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 217 (4th rev. ed.
1968). For a concise review of the managerialist approach, see Alfred F. Conard, Beyond
Managenalism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 120-30 (1988).
Bebchuk and Fried concisely s
· e the central doctrines of the managerialist school as
follows:
The dispersed owners of a typical publicly traded company cannot monitor
or direct managers' actions, so the executives who exert day-to-day control in such
companies often have considerable discretion. In such a situation, ownership and
control are separated. Shareholders own the company, but the managers exercise a
substantial amount of control over how it is run.
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 15. In the managerialist account, shareholders are
dispersed and hold diversified portfolios; accordingly, they are relatively apathetic with
respect to the management of the corporations they own. This apathy permits managers and
inside directors to exercise effective control over the corporation. Lynne L. Dallas, The New
Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards ofDirectors, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1363, 137071 (2002).
95. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 550.
96. Id at 551.
97. Id at 548 n.8 (citing with disapproval Chancellor Allen's view in Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988), that ''[t]he theory of out
corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not
create Platonic masters").
.

4
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presumably consented to the corporate governing structure, which
98
delegates decision-making authority to the board.
Three considerations might make us question whether theories of
corporate democracy and freedom of contract really justify the
protections afforded to corporate decision makers under the Rule.
First, it is usually the case that common shareholders have no real
voice in choosing the people who make decisions on behalf of a public
99
corporation. Outside of the context of hostile takeovers, electoral
challenges to incwnbent board members are "practically nonexistent,''
averaging about two per year between 1996 and 2002 in corporations
100
with market capitalization in excess of $200 million.
Second, even if we were convinced that common shareholders
had actual power to elect boards, boards and executives deprive
shareholders of information to which they are entitled and which they
101
could use to protect their interests as shareholders. At times, it is
perfectly appropriate for a board to make decisions without informing
shareholders. Much of what boards do is confidential and could not be
openly discussed without doing irreparable harm to the corporation
(and thus to shareholders) by disclosing prospective business plans and
102
strategy.
However, as we shall see in the context of executive
98. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (DeL Ch. 2005),
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The [Rule] serves to protect and promote the role of the
board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.").
99. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 Bus.
LAW. 43, 45 (2003) ("Although shareholder power to replace directors is supposed to be an
important element of our corporate governance system, it is largely a myth.").
100. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 25; Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 46.
101. See discussion intra notes 216-219 and accompanying text regarding camouflage
of executive compensation.
102. See Tender Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6158, Exchange Act Release No.
16,384, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,958, 44 Fed. Reg~ 70,326, 70,335-36 (Nov.
29, 1979) (considering secrecy in the context of a Schedule 140-9 filing and illustrating the
SEC's attempts to accommodate business demands for secrecy); see also Schedule 140-9, 17
C.F.R. 240.14d-1 01 (2006); 17 C.F.R. 229.I 006 Instruction to Item 1006(d)( 1) (2006) ("If an
agreement in principle has not been reached at the time of filing, no disclosure ... is required
of the possible terms of or the parties to the transaction if in the opinion of the board of
directors of the subject company disclosure would jeopardize continuation of the
negotiations."); Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1523 (lOth Cir. 1997) (finding in the
context of ERISA that requiring employers reveal their internal deliberations could hinder the
achievement of "'business goals' by allowing competitors to know that the employer is
considering a labor reduction, . . . a merger, or some other. strategic move"); Staffin v.
Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982) (fmding merit in the opinions of other courts
and conunentators that in the area of takeover bids, disclosure of such discussions may do
more hann to the corporation than secrecy itself); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis ofthe Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L~
REv. 1059, 1091 (1990) (arguing corporate infonnation should not be disclosed if, in.the
directors' judgment, the disclosure would jeopardize the value of the firm's shares in the
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compensation schemes, boards also deprive shareholders of
inforntation to which they are entitled when disclosure of the
information poses no risk of harm to the interests of the corporation
other than the reputational or outrage harm that would attach to
disclosure of excessive executive compensation. Where there is no
need to protect the confidentiality of decision-making processes, there
is no reason why directors should not answer to the shareholders in
whose interests they are supposed to act.
Finally, even if we believe that shareholders freely elect corporate
directors, those directors have fiduciary duties to protect the interests
103
of both the corporation and the shareholders. Thus, it hardly seems
appropriate to shield the fiduciaries from liability for negligent
conduct in connection with the execution of their fiduciary duties
when we do not similarly shield other professionals in whom
104
individuals place their trust and confidence.
Even if we view the relationship between shareholders and
directors as a voluntary one in which shareholders have delegated
certain decision-making powers to the directors, it is not clear why the
directors should not be held to an ordinary negligence standard. The
decision to invest in a corporation can be analogized to the process of
choosing to enter into a relationship with a provider of professional
105
services, such as a doctor, a lawyer, an architect, or a mechanic. The
fact that one enters the relationship deliberately does not protect the
professional from liability if she perfonns her professional tasks
106
negligently.
.

.

aggregate); Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure
Requirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: '.!4re Ute There let?, ,, 20 CARDozo L. REv.
135, 136 & n.l (1998) (stating that managers are willing to disclose large amounts of
information to appease investors, but managers prefer not to disclo.se "(s]orne information
[that] is too valuable to reveal to one's competitors" because "[i]nfonnation about strategy
and business segments can help competitors if too much detail is offered, hurting
shareholders in the process").
103. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (''The shareholder constituents
of a Delaware corporation are entitled to rely upon their elected directors to discharge their
fiduciary duties at all times."); Kaplan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 729
(Del. 1988) ("The exercise of this managerial power is tempered by fundamental fiduciary
obligations owed by the directors to the corporation and its shareholders."); Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d ~03, 510 (Del. 1939) ("[Directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and
its stockholders.").
104. See Gevurtz, supra note 7, at 315.
105. Id
106. See id ("The fact that shareholders have entered into a voluntary relationship
with the directors is not different from most situations involving malpractice claims. The
same is generally true of patients with doctors, clients with attorneys, and a host of other
situations out of which negligence actions may arise.").
..
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Easterbrook and Fischel offer what might be considered a
corollary to this weak sovereignty approach, placing their faith in the
107
efficiency of capital markets. Shareholders who are dissatisfied with
the stewardship of a corporation will simply take their money
elsewhere, and they are also able to diversify their risk by investing in
108
This model suggests that
nt1merous firms across capital markets.
corporations served by poor managers will underperform. Investors, if
they are paying attention, will move on, and the managers will be
replaced with better ones when the corporation's fortunes suffer
accordingly. But markets do not always work this way, and, even if
they did, this rationale does little to explain why the Rule should
prevent an investor who was hartned by a board's negligence from
seeking legal redress for that wrong. When investors discover the
breach, they may well choose to move their capital elsewhere but by
the time they do so, they already may have suffered significant losses.
b.

The Strong Sovereignty Rationale: Director Primacy

The director-primacy model is a significant conceptual
contribution to our understanding of the way corporations both do and
should operate. Director primacy provides the most sophisticated
account of why the Rule is necessary to protect directors from liability
for their business decisions. For that reason, it is worthwhile to
explore the theory of director primacy in some detail. This Article
concludes that though the theory that directors, not shareholders, are
the center of decision-making power within the corporation is
generally correct, there are still circ11mstances in which the board must
answer to the corporation's shareholders. In such circut11stances, the
Rule should not impede the realization of the goal of shareholder
wealth maximization.
As a descriptive model, director primacy has certain advantages
109
As a normative
over the dominant shareholder-primacy model.
model, directory primacy has certain advantages over managerial
110
approaches to the corporation.
If we adopt the director-primacy
model, we would expect to favor a robust Rule that safeguards the
107. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 53, at 96 (''Managers must perform
well to keep share prices high; if they do not, they can expect to be replaced.").
108. Id at 99; see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The redress for failures that arise from faithful
management must come from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free
flow of capital, and not from this Court.").
109. See infra notes 113-128 and accompanying text.
110. See in/Tanotes 129-145 and accompanying text.
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authority of boards to make the decisions that corporate structures
1 1
have placed in their hands. l
The argument for director primacy derives_from a contractarian
view of the corporation that attempts to avoid reification of the
112
corporation by viewing it as a nexus of contracts. According to the
director-primacy model, there must be some decision-making power
113
that permits action by a nonreified corporation, and the center of that
114
action is the board of directors. "The board of directors thus can be
seen as a sort of Platonic guardian a sw· generis body serving as the
nexus for the various contracts making up the corporation and whose
powers flow not from shareholders alone, but from the complete set of
115
contracts constituting the firm." This view of the corporation seems
to find some statutory support in section 141(a) of Delaware's General
Corporation Law and the Van Gorkom decision:
"Under Delaware law, the [Rule] is the offspring of the fundamental
principle, codified in [Delaware General Corporation Law] § 14l(a),
that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by
or under its board of directors. . . . The [Rule] exists to protect and
promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to
A:,116
De1aware Wlectors.

Shareholders, by contrast, "have no power to initiate corporate action,"
as the statutory structtrre "is one in which the board acts and the
117
shareholders, at most, react." In addition, in response to arguments
that executives, not directors, control corporations, the directorIll. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 603 (''The [Rule] prevents such a shift in the
locU$ of decisiorunaking authority from boards to judges by establishing a limited system for
case-by-casejudicial oversight in which review of the substantive merits of those decisions is
avoided.'').
112. Id at 552-53; see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Book Review Essay, Executive
Compensation: Who Decides?, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1615, 1646 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra note 4 7) (''[S]hareholders have no natural or inherent rights of ownership or
control. Instead, they have only those rights for which they bargained. And those rights are
extremely limited.'' (footnote omitted)).
113. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 555.. I do not share the contractarians' concerns
regarding reification. Once we recognize that certain business associations are to be treated
as legal persons, we transform such entities into· subjects for both legal and real-world
purposes. The reification has occurred; and I see no advantage in a legal theory that pretends
otherwise.
114. ld at 559.
115. Id at 560.
116. Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 109 (quoting Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985)); see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (DeL Ch.
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The [Rule] serves to protect and promote the role of
the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.").
117. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 559.
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primacy model contends that "[i]n situations of overt conflict between
the board and top management, the board's authority prevails as a
118
matter of law, if not always in practice."
This quotation provides two key openings for criticism of the
director-primacy approach. First, as we shall discuss in further detail
in the context of executive compensation, situations of conflict
between boards of directors and top management are exceedingly
rare not because managers are beholden to the board, but because
119
Second, in rare cases of conflict
managers dominate the board.
between a board and managers, while the board's authority should
always prevail as a matter of Jaw, if it does prevail as a matter of fact, it
does so only in response to shareholder derivative suits or other outside
120
pressures that call attention to breaches of duties owed by executives.
•

118. ld at 563.
119. See discussion in/Ta Part III.B.3. There is extensive literature on the phenomenon
known as "board capture." See~ e.g., Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the
Management-Captured Board-The History ofa Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REv. 127,
134 ( 1996) (suggesting that equity compensation of board members will transfonn them into
owner-directors and reduce the possibility of board passivity); Charles M. Elson, The Duty of
Care, Compensation~ and Stock Ownership, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 649, 709 (1995) ("The most
critical problem confronting United States corporation law today is ... the flourishing of the
passive board created by management capture.").
120. Some recent examples: Radio Shack's CEO, David Edmondson, resigned .in a
"mutual decision" with the board after revelations that he had fabricated credentials on his
resume. Floyd Norris, RadioShack ChiefResigns After Lying, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at
C I [hereinafter Norris, RadioShack ChiefResigns]. RadioS hack agreed to pay the departing
executive a severance package of $975,000. Floyd Norris, Fo1mer RadioShack Chief May
Gain /Tom Options, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Norris, Fo1111er RadioShack
ChiefMay Gain From Options]. Clearly all the negative publicity relating to this revelation
was crucial, because the board was not moved to act by the fact that "RadioShack's stock
perfonned poorly in the time after Mr. Edmondson became president," although the move
might have been motivated by the twelve percent decline in the stock during the week when
Mr. Edmondson's fabricated credentials were disclosed. Norris, RadioShack ChiefResigns,
at C 1. Analog Devices recently disclosed that it paid its CEO, Jerald Fishman, $144.7 million
in deferred compensation. Gretchen Morgenson, A ~Holy Cow' Moment in Pay/and, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 3, at I. Although such disclosures would be required under new
proposed SEC rules, a company spokeswoman explained that Analog Devises "wanted to be
completely transparent to its shareholders." Id A commendable sentiment but apparently not
consistent with the company's past practices; it is in the midst of settling with the SEC to end
the investigation into allegations the company improperly timed its options' grants to officers
and directors so the options would be granted just prior to the release of favorable financial
reports. ld Analog Devises is reported to have agreed to pay a $3 million penalty, while Mr.
Fishman will pay $1 million plus a disgorgement penalty of undisclosed magnitude. Id The
company neither admits nor denies any wrongdoing. ld Apparently, the company's desire to
be "completely transparent to its shareholders" has its limits. ld; see Rakesh Khurana &
Katharina Pick, The Social Nature of Boards, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1259, 1273 (2005) ('~
popular criticism leveled by legislators and scholars against boards involved in recent
corporate scandals is that they did not have the cowage or the conviction to challenge senior
management and/or the CEO on important issues.").
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The theory of director primacy purports to be both nortnatively
121
and descriptively more accurate than the shareholder-primacy model.
The model is descriptively superior, Bainbridge contends, because
most of the time boards make decisions that are not subject to
shareholder review: "In general, shareholders of public corporations
have neither the legal right, the practical ability, nor the desire to
exercise the kind of control necessary for meaningful monitoring of
122
the corporation's agents."
The model is nonnatively superior
because director primacy permits the corporation to achieve its most
123
important goal: shareholder wealth m . · · .tion.
As a normative matter, given all the clear conflicts of interest
124
brought to light by recent corporate governance scandals,
Bainbridge's claim that boards can protect shareholder interests and
uphold the nonn of shareholder wealth m · · ation is undercut by
his concession that "a substantial number of directors feel a
responsibility towards stakeholders" and thus will not always decide in
125
favor of shareholder wealth m . · · ation. . One area that scholars
have identified where the interests of shareholders and the interests of
directors diverge is in long-term versus short-term rises in stock
126
The real conflict of interest here is actually between
priceS.
.

.

121. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 563-74; see Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 86 ("I have
argued elsewhere that shareholder primacy is neither not matively persuasive nor descriptively
accurate."). But see Wayne 0. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Onmicare, and the FunctiQn of
Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REv. 511, 514-15 (2004) (identifying both descriptive and
normative weakness in the director-primacy model).
122. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 568.
123~ Id at 551-52.
124. See Rachel Beck, Corporate Takeovers Can Bring Executives Big Takeaways, ST.
LoUis POST•DISPATCH, June 5, 2005, at E7 ('"Executives keep finding way[s] to reward
themselves, even when shareholders or their workers might not be getting the best deal
.... "'); Claudia H. Deutsch, Take lfJur Best Shot· New Surveys Show that Big Business Has
a P.R. Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2005, at Cl ("Pollsters, researchers, evert many corporate
chiefs themselves say that business is under attack by a majority of the public, which believes
that executives are bent on destroying the environment, cooking the books and lining their
own pockets."); Kurt Eichenwald, Big Test Looms for Prosecutors at Enron Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 26, 2006, at AI ("Enron has emerged as a company that failed to follow the dictates of
federal securities laws, with executives who deceived investors, directors and, in some cases;
one another."); Arthur Levitt Jr., Cutting the Corruption, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at Al5
("As with many of the disgraced corporations of the past few years Adelphia, Tyco and
WorldCom, for example--... [c]onflicts of interest abound, oversight has been myopic and
those given the public's trust have used it to enrich themselves.").
125. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 576.
126. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A
Case Study ofPerverse incentives, Nonperfonnance Pay, and Camouflage, 30 J. CORP. L. 807,
808 (2005) ("[T]he structure of both equity and non-equity compensation provides executives
with incentives to inflate short-term earnings at the expense of long-tenn shareholder
value.").
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managers, whose incentive-based compensation often depends on
hitting certain performance ~gets, and shareholders, who may value
127
more highly a slow, steady accumulation of value in the corporation.
However, in this conflict between shareholder interests and managerial
interests, boards consistently side with management, in part because
128
their own incentives are linked to short-tenn perfonnance.
Director-primacy theorists are certainly correct to point out that,
from the perspective of a nonnative theory of corporate governance,
director primacy is preferable to managerialism because managers are
less likely than directors to make shareholder wealth m ·· · ation
29
their prime objective! However, because director-primacy theory
concedes that the purpose of the corporation is the m · · ation of
shareholder wealth, shareholder primacy holds the normative edge
over director primacy, even if directors do a fairly good job of looking
out for shareholder interests. While rational-choice models seem to
indicate that boards are well-equipped to promote shareholder
130
interests, those models do not show that boards are better-equipped
to do so than are the shareholders themselves. Thus, although the
director-primacy model has a strong advantage over managerialism on
the nonnative side, it cannot provide a general, normative model of
how corporations should be run in the interests of shareholder wealth
m · · ation because there are a small but significant number of
circumstances where shareholder and board interests are not aligned.
In such circumstances, the Rule creates an impediment to shareholders
seeking to force boards to m · · e value for shareholders. Such an
impediment is only proper where shareholder litigation threatens vital
interests of the corporation.
12 7. Id at 809-12 (detailing how executive pay at Fannie Mae created "perverse
incentives" to inflate annual earnings but provided no penalties when the company later had
to restate its earnings); Dallas, supra note 94, at 1365 (''[T]he new managerialism involves
greater attention to short-tenn shareholder value, which also does not serve the interests of
shareholders.").
128. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 205 (noting companies now routinely
compensate directors with equity, including option grants). One recent study shows a
correlation between executive pay and director pay, suggesting that directors will go along
with managers in order to be rewarded more generously for their services to the company.
Ivan E. Brick et al., CEO Compensation, Director Compensation, and Fiim Per!OJmance:
Evidence ofCronyism?, 12 J. CoRP. FIN. 403; 421 (2006).
129. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 561 ("In the famous debate between
[managerialists] Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd, ... both theorists assumed the existence
of managerial discretion distinct from powers delegated by the board of directors or from
duties to shareholders.").
130. See id. at 574-92 {contending directors have substantial incentives to run their
corporations in the interests of the corporation's shareholders).
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While director primacy has the nonnative edge over
managerialism, managerialism seems to have a far stronger empirical
basis than the director-primacy model, and thus the director-primacy
model is more vulnerable to criticism on the descriptive level than it is
on the normative level. Directors do not run corporations; for the most
131
part, they simply approve decisions made by executives. Although
those executives are, in theory, chosen by and accountable to the board,
in reality, boards are generally dominated by corporate executives who
do not have the time, the interest, the expertise, or the incentive to act
132
as significant checks on managerial decision-making authority.
Decades ago, Melvin Eisenberg recognized that boards of
133
directors had become largely passive. Indeed, Eisenberg concluded:
Many of the modem board's functions ... are for the most part
relatively unimportant, or can easily be located elsewhere. Making
business policy, although widely held to be a central board function, is
usually beyond the competence of the board, since a corporate organ
cannot be meaningfully involved in making business policy unless its
members are highly active, and it is not realistic to expect a high degree
134
of activity from the board.
Today, corporate boards' one significant remaining responsibility is the
135
However,
selection and monitoring of the corporation's CE0.
136
passivity characterizes the board's typical role in that process as well.
The protections provided by the Rule, if applied in the context of

131. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 140 ( 1976) ("[A]11 serious students of corporate affairs recognize that . . . in the
typical large publicly held corporation the board does not 'manage' the corporation's business
in the ordinary meaning of that tenn. Rather, that function is vested in the executives.").
132. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 761 n.490 (DeL Ch. 2005),
aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("[T]he law recognizes that corporate boards ... cannot
themselves manage the operations of the ftnn, but may satisfy their obligations by
thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and plans and monitoring
perfonnance.").
133. See EISENBERG, supra note 131, at 140 (citing research indicating that boards of
large corporations did not initiate decisions on either specific or broad matters and were
largely passively approving policies initiated by management).
134. /d. at 169.
135. See id. at 162 (describing the board's role in electing and dismissing CEOs as
"both of critical importance to the corporation and uniquely suited for performance by the
board'').
13 6. See EISENBERG, supra note 131, at 164 (characterizing the board's role in
selecting a CEO as "real albeit restrained"); RAKESH
A, SEARCHING FOR A
CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE iRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs, at X (2002) (arguing
that boards tend to select CEOs "for their social attributes rather than for their possession of
relevant skills and experience").
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executive compensation, are a significant impediment to boards'
performance of their most important remaining duty.
Bainbridge notes that ~'modern boards of directors ... meet more
often, are more independent from management, own more stock, and
137
have better access to information" than their predecessors.
Bainbridge therefore contends that "board-capture'' by management
138
"seems less valid today .... than it once was. " However, there simply
is not adequate evidence that recent reforms have had any effect on
139
director performance. Rather, as recent corporate scandals establish,
boards still too often merely rubber stamp the decisions of corporate
140
officers.
Though the reforms that Bainbridge-mentions are significant, it is
hard to imagine how boards are now better able to control a
corporation than they were previously, when outside directors still
devote very little time to their directorial duties. Research suggests
that the average outside director devotes 100 hours per year to his or
141
her duties as director.
The nwnbers were not much different a
142
generation ago.
Based on the amount of time outside directors
devoted to their duties as board members in the 1980s, Bayless
Manning concluded that no human being could stay on top of all of the
aspects of a corporation's business ''on a one-and-a-half-day-a-month
143
basis." Manning also noted that management, not outside directors,
144
sets the agenda for board meetings.
Boards thus largely rely on

137. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 563.
138. Id at 562.
139. See KHuRANA, supra note 136~ at 81-82 (summarizing recent quantitative studies
that indicate director shareholding has little effect on director behavior or fmn perfonnance).
Bainbridge's assertions to the contrary seem overly optimistic. See Bainbridge, supra note
93, at 562-63 (citing trends in the 1980s and 1990s that "encourage more active and effective
board oversight").
140. See Susan-Jacqueline Butler, Models ofModem Corporations: A Comparative
Analysis ofGe1man and US. Corporate Structures, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 555, 588
(2000) (stating that some boards rubber stamp anything that a corporate officer proposes);
Eric A. Lustig, IRS, Inc. The IRS Oversight Board Effective Refo111i or Just Politics?
Some Early Thoughts /Tom a Corporate Law Perspective, 42 DuQ. L. REv. 725, 755 (2004)
("Commentators have long challenged whether the corporate board of directors actually
governs corporations, or whether it is largely a rubber stamp for the chief executive officer,
who is often the chainnan of the board.").
141. BEBCHUK& FRIED, supmnote 47, at 37.
142. Manning, supra note 24, at 1481 ("The most recent survey (1982) shows that the
average director of a publicly held company devotes a total of about 123 hours per year to his
board and committee work, including travel.")'.,
143. ld
144. Idat 1484.
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management to run things and intervene only in exceptional
145
circumstances.
The fundamental insight of director primacy derives from
Kenneth Arrow's view that decision-making structures must be based
146
either on consensus or authority. Given these options, in large-scale
business organizations, authority-based models have clear efficiency
advantages over consensus-based models for decision making: ''[T]he
chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that it permits
the aggregation of large capital pools, but rather that it provides a
hierarchical decisionmaking structure well-suited to the problem of
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees,
147
Following
managers; shareholders, creditors, and other inputs."
Arrow, the adherents of the director-primacy theory regard the balance
between authority and accountability as a zero-sum game: the more
boards are held accountable to shareholders, the less the corporation
148
derives efficiency benefits from its hierarchical structure. From this
perspective1 the organizational advantage of the corporation is lost if
the board's decision-making authority is subject to constant review by
the consensus-based shareholders "If every decision of A is to be
reviewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of
149
authority from A to R"
150
Bainbridge returns to this mantra at every opportunity, and yet
he also acknowledges that "[t]he right to fire is not the right to exercise
151
Indeed, it is no more
fiat; it is only the right to discipline."
. .

145. See id at 1484-85 (describing two exceptional circumstances when boards seize
the initiative).
146. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 ( 1974 ).
147. Bainbridge, supmnote 93, at 572.
148. See Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1654 (arguing against increasing shareholder
power over review of board decisions "because it defeats the very purpose of authority-based
decisionmaking structures namely, to concentrate discretionary authority in the hands of a
central agency with power to make decisions that are binding on the whole").
149. ARRow, supra note 146, at 78 (emphasis added). A similar formula has been
adopted by the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court:
The power to hold to account is the power to interfere and, ultimately, the power to
decide. If stockholders are given too easy access to courts; the effect is to transfer
decisionmaking power from the board to the stockholders .... By limiting judicial
review of board decisions, the-[Rulel preserves the statutory scheme of centralizing
authority in the board of directors.
Michael P. Dooley & E. Nonnan Veasey, The Role of the Board in Den·vative Litigation.:
Delaware Law and the Current ALIProposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503, 522 ( 1989).
150. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 108; Bainbridge, supra-note 93, at 573; 603;
Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1650, 1654.
151. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 570.
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problematic from the perspective of the efficiency of decision-making
processes to recognize ultimate shareholder primacy than it is to
recognize that the U.S. govermnent is ultimately answerable to the
people. If every decision by a board were subject to the grueling
process of shareholder review, corporate decision-making processes
would grind to a halt, just as the U.S. govermnent could not function if
every executive or legislative decision were subject to approval by
plebiscite. Nonetheless, the U.S. government must, in the end, answer
to the people, and corporate boards must answer to their shareholders.
Moreover, as the advocates of director primacy acknowledge, because
the mechanisms of shareholder oversight are cumbersome and
expensive, there is little danger that shareholder primacy would throw
a wrench into the mechanisms of corporate decision making, even if
52
directors are not protected by the Rule!
Even if the reality of
corporate governance is that shareholders rarely yield actual control,
the weakness of the director-primacy model is that it "overlooks the
important (albeit limited) situations in which corporate legal rules do
153
and should vest decision-making authority elsewhere."
As the
adherents of director primacy acknowledge, shareholder primacy
154
remains the dominant view among corporate law scholars.
But that does not mean that most legal scholars view shareholders
as controlling the day-to-day operations of the corporation. Rather,
shareholders, often acting through courts, only occasionally take
authority from the board in order to protect what most agree is the
155
primary goal of the corporation, shareholder wealth m · · ation.
152. Id at 557-58. Bainbridge identifies collective action problems, as well as
"rational apathy," as sources of shareholder inaction. Id But there are also numerous and
significant procedural hurdles that shareholders must overcome before they can challenge
board decisions, including the requirement that plaintiffs either make "demand" on the board
to investigate the cause of action or claim that demand is excused as futile. Roberta Romano
swnmarizes the issue very succinctly: "The efficacy of shareholder litigation as a governance
mechanism is hampered by collective action problems because the cost of bringing a lawsuit,
while less than shareholders' aggregate gain, is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiff's
pro rata benefit." Romano, supra note 82, at 55; see Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811-12
(Del. 1984) ("[T]he demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 exists at the threshold, frrst
to insure that a stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies, and then to provide a
safeguard against strike suits.").
153. Hanewicz, supra note 121, at 520.
154. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 563 ("Today, most corporate law scholars
embrace some variant of shareholder primacy."); Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 85 ("In the
academic literature, the prevailing answers to these questions [relating to the purposes and
control of corporations] are provided by the shareholder primacy model.").
155. See Hanewicz, supra note 121, at 515 ("[D]irector primacy overlooks the
infrequent, but nonetheless important, times when decision-making authority is taken from
the board and vested in other institutions, such as the courts or the shareholders.").
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While the director-primacy approach has obvious advantages over the
shareholder-primacy model in describing the day-to-day workings of
corporations in which ordinary shareholders have little say, both de
!iJcto and de jure, our system of corporate law recognizes that ultimate
156
control lies in the hands of shareholders.
Director-primacy theorists contend that the major benefits of
corporate governing structures are lost if the authority of directors is
157
subordinated to that of shareholders.
In fact, however, numerous
factors, both practical and statutory, prevent shareholders from
interfering in day-to-day decision-making processes involving
corporate boards and executives. Nonetheless, in cases of conflict
between the shareholders' interests and those of the board,
shareholders must retain the ultimate authority to hold directors
accountable, and the Rule should not impede existing mechanisms of
director accountability to shareholders.

c

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion permits some tentative conclusions. It
is clear that despite its widespread use by courts to excuse directors
from liability for violations of their duty of care, the Rule is a poorly
understood piece of legal doctrine. Most courts view the Rule as either
an evidentiary presutnption or a heightened standard of liability rather
than as an abstention doctrine, and as such, it serves mostly to protect
individual directors, not corporations, from the risks and costs of
litigation. The interests of the corporation are protected only
indirectly to the extent it is in the interest of the corporation to be
able, through the Rule, to shield its directors from liability. Indeed,
most justifications for the Rule focus on the need to protect
directors because we believe them more qualified than judges to
make business decisions, or because we want to encourage risk taking
by business leaders, or because we think the structure of corporate
governance entitles them to be checked only through the most
deferential forms of review. None of these justifications for the Rule is
satisfactory. Moreover, as a standard of review rather than an
abstention doctrine, the Rule does relatively little to protect

156. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (discussing the board's
fiduciary duties owed to the company's shareholder owners).
157. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 557 ("It is very hard (if not impossible) to
imagine a modem public corporation that could be effectively run using consensus-based
decisionmaking mechanisn1s.").
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corporations from the harms attendant to litigation, especially the
discovery process.
The tendency of courts to view the Rule as requiring a heightened
standard of review rather than as an abstention doctrine is curious
because abstention makes more sense based on the standard
justifications for the Rule. If the Rule exists because business leaders
are better positioned to make business decisions than judges, changing
the standard of review is clearly an inadequate solution. If a judge is
not well-qualified to detern1ine whether a director's judgment was
negligent, she is also not well-qualified to determine whether that
judgment crossed the line from ordinary into gross negligence or some
other such standard. Rather, if our concern is with competence, judges
should simply refrain from any substantive review of business
decisions taken by a non-self-interested board after due consideration
and absent evidence of fraud or bad faith.
Similarly, if the purpose of the Rule is to encourage risk taking by
corporate decision makers, treating the Rule as a heightened standard
of review is not nearly as effective as treating the Rule as an abstention
doctrine. However, because statutory protections already shield board
members from personal liability in most cases involving alleged
breaches of the duty of care, the real purpose of the Rule today should
not be to protect board members from liability but to protect the
corporation and the board from the dissipation of assets and
reputational harm that results from litigation. But a heightened
standard of review does little to discourage litigation challenging board
decisions, and, if courts do not treat the Rule as an abstention doctrine,
they subject directors to the humiliation associated with a substantive
review of their decision-making process, which in turn could deter
boards from engaging in the risky business ventures that the Rule is
designed to encourage. Only a rule of abstention that prevents any
review of the substance of board decisions really insulates both boards
and corporations from exposure to harmful litigation.
Finally, if one subscribes to the sovereignty rationale behind the
Rule, heightened scrutiny makes very little sense. If one believes that
through the structures of corporate governance or through the nexus of
contracts that create corporations, shareholders have delegated to
corporate boards the authority to make decisions on behalf of the
corporation, it should follow that courts should respect that contractual
allocation of authority and abstain from review of board decisions
rather than review such decisions under a deferential standard.
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Insofar as it embraces the abstention approach to the Rule, this
Article advocates strengthening the Rule as a prophylactic tool that
protects corporations from exposure to litigation. In its current
incarnation, the Rule does little to protect the corporation's interests.
Indeed, the dynamics of shareholder derivative suits leads to
158
settlements that benefit plaintiffs' attorneys but not really the
corporation or its shareholders, who end up paying for the suit through
159
higher insurance costs the corporation is forced to pay.
However, the Rule's deployment should be limited to those
circumstances when the prospect of litigation genuinely threatens the
well being of the corporation. Otherwise, the Rule prevents
shareholder derivative suits from serving their purpose as a check on
160
management
The Rule should apply only to cases in which the
discovery attendant to litigation would require corporations to disclose
prospective business plans. Such cases could arise in many contexts~
After a quick review of circumstances in which the Rule should still
protect the business judgment of directors, this Article limits itself to
the argument that, in almost all cases, a_board_'s decision relating to
executive compensation has nothing to do with its prospective business
plans and thus should not be afforded the-protections of the Rule. Thi8
Article addresses corporate governance regulations developed through
state law. Congress responded to the corporate governance crisis
associated with collapses at Enron, WorldCom, and other companies
161
by enacting the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002.
. .

158. See Romano, supm note 82, at 84 ("The principal beneficiaries of [shareholder
derivative] litigation therefore appear to be attorneys, who win fee awards in 90 percent of
settled suits.").
159. See id at 57 ("Because 0&0 insurers reimburse both sides' expenses in a
settlement, unlike other civil litigation, in -shareholder suits neither party internalizes litigation
costs. A corporation's insurance premium may well rise following a lawsuit, but this cost is
borne by all of the shareholders, rather than the litigating parties.").
160. See id. at 84 (concluding that an empirical study of shareholder suits brought
from the 1960s through 1987 provided little evidence that such suits deterred misconduct by
corporate managers).
161. Pub. L. No. 107...204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as. amended in scattered sections of
11, 15, 18 & 29 U.S.C. (Supp. 2005)). For an excellent, detailed discussion of the impact of
Sarbanes Oxley on the law of corporate governance and directors' fiduciary duties, see
Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a Climate of
Corporate Govemance Rcfo1m, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. (forthcoming 2007).
.

.
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ill.

THE RULE AND FORCED DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS PLANS

A.

The Need To Protect Corporations Against Forced Disclosure

Litigation is expensive. Shareholder derivative litigation is
162
especially expensive.
But the cost is unacceptably high when a
corporation might be forced to reveal its business plans in order to
respond to the discovery requests of a -plaintiff or plaintiff class.
Conceived as an abstention doctrine, one purpose of the Rule is
to get suits dismissed before the corporation is forced to produce
confidential documents in discovery. The Rule is thus deployed in the
interests of the corporation rather than in the interests of its directors.
It protects the corporation and the confidential decision-making
processes through which boards run corporations~ Treating the: Rule
either as an evidentiary presumption or a standard of review only
protects directors from liability; it does nothing to protect corporations
from exposure to damaging litigation. However, the Rule should not
be used to head off all litigation against corporate defendants; absent
the Rule's protections, litigation can serve as an effective constraint on
corporate directors helping to enforce the duty of care.
Only when litigation requires disclosure of prospective business
plans should courts invoke the Rule as an abstention doctrine. In those
circumstances, a court should inquire only into whether the board's
decision-making process was proper, and, if' so, the court should
eschew any substantive evaluation of the board's decision. If the Rule
is applied in such a manner, it will achieve the goal of protecting the
corporation from undue intrusion into its internal matters.
1..

Mergers and Acquisitions

Decisions about mergers and acquisitions often involve life-and163
death decisions about the future of a corporation.
Challenging a
board in the process of considering its merger and/or acquisition
options would clearly require the disclosure of information crucial to
the corporation's prospective business plans. In such circumstances,
See id. at 58 (stating that shareholder suits "are the largest and most expensive
category of claims filed against directors and officers'').. One of the key reasons why
shareholder derivative litigation is a weak check on the power of corporate managers is such
litigation is so expensive. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 568 n.l 01.
163. Se.e.t e.g., SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 E2d 39; 47 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[A] merger
... is the most important event that can occur in a small corporation's life, to wit, its death
....;'); Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939, 949 (Del. Ch. 2004) (describing a transaction in
which the Sara Lee Corporation would purchase the Earthgrains Company as the most
important transaction in Earthgrains' short .life '"to wit, its death'").
162.
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the Rule should apply to protect the corporation from having to
disclose all information other than information relating to the propriety
of the board's decision-making processes. It is possible that even after
a merger or acquisition has been completed, the substantive rationale
underlying the relevant business decisions should be protected by the
Rule as the merger or acquisition in question might be merely one step
in a larger business plan that will entail future transactions. In most
cases, therefore, involving challenges to a board's decision relating to
mergers or acquisitions, courts should invoke the Rule as an abstention
doctrine and limit themselves to reviewing only the procedural
propriety of the board's decision-making process in relation to the
transaction.
2.

Dividend Policies
64

Dodgd is most commonly cited to illustrate the principle of
165

shareholder primacy. The Ford Motor Company lost the part of that
case relating to Henry Ford's decision not to issue large dividends
because Henry Ford testified he wanted to invest in the company in
order to '"employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build
166
up their lives and their homes. '" The court ordered Ford to issue a
large dividend to its shareholders because Henry Ford could not be
permitted to continue the corporation ''as a semi-eleemosynary
167
institution."
Admonishing Mr. Ford, the court noted that "[a]
business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
168
profit of the stockholders."
The case was wrongly decided in my
view, not because the court was wrong about shareholder primacy, but
because Henry Ford understood that he could not testify truthfully
about his reasons for not issuing a large dividend to Ford's
shareholders without revealing prospective business plans and his

164. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W 668 (Mich. 1919).
165. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transfo1mations ofthe Corporate
Fo1111: A Histoncal Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL.l CORP. L. 767,
769 n.8 (2005) (calling Dodge the classic affinnation of the shareholder-primacy doctrine);
Nathan Oman, Corporations and Autonomy Theones ofContract: A Critique ofthe New Lex
Mercatoria, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 101, 135 (2005) (''The locus classicus for the shareholder
primacy norm is Dodge ...."); Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 497, 520 (1992) ("Dodge has long been considered the preeminent
example of the shareholder primacy view of the corporation ....'?).
166. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683.
167. Id
168. Id at 684.
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concerns regarding the threat of competition from the Dodge brothers,
169
who held a ten percent interest in Ford.
A few years before the Dodge brothers brought their suit against
Ford, they had stopped supplying Ford with parts and began to build
170
their own cars to compete with Ford. At the sante time, John Dodge
stepped down from Ford's board after having served as a director for
171
ten years. Henry Ford had very real concerns about the prospect that
the Dodge brothers might use their dividends from his company to
launch a rival corporation that would endanger Ford's ability to
generate profits for its shareholders in the future. ~ This is precisely
the situation in which the Rule, as an abstention doctrine, should apply,
because Henry Ford's decision to resist paying out large dividends to
shareholders was based on his concerns about competition from the
Dodge brothers, concerns he reasonably believed he could not disclose
without doing harm to his company.
But it by no means will always be the case that decisions relating
to dividend policies will relate to a corporation's prospective business
plans and thus be entitled to the Rule's protections. For example, in
the notorious Kamin v. American Express Co., American Express
decided to issue to its shareholders a one-time, in-kind dividend of
stock in Donaldson, Lufkin, and Jenrette (DLJ), which had declined
173
significantly in value while in American Express' possession.
Plaintiffs criticized the American Express board's decision to issue the
in-kind dividend on the ground that American Express thereby lost the
tax benefit it might otherwise have gained by selling the stock and
174
realizing the capital loss. The board argued that taking such a loss
would have hurt the value of the stock, but the vast majority of
scholars agree with plaintiffs that the company's stock price already
reflected the decline in the value of the DLJ stock, and thus the
issuance of the in-kind dividend was, at-best, poorly informed from the
17

•

169. ld at 669-70.
170. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy No1111, 23 J. CoRP. L. 277, 316
(1998).
171. ld
172. See Dodge, 170 N. W. at 671-72. The opinion reproduced a letter from the Dodge
brothers asking Henry Ford to "'advise us by early mail as to whether there is any foundation
for the rumors referred to and that plans for the extension or expansion of the operations of
business of the company that would absorb any considerable part of the company's present
resources, are under consideration and the status of any negotiations relating thereto."' Jd at
672.
173. Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
174. Jd at 809~10.
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perspective of the efficient-capital-markets hypothesis.
The court
176
deferred to the board's decision under the Rule. This decision seems
to have had nothing to do with the company's prospective business
plans, and the discovery attendant to the case revealed nothing about
the company that was not already public knowledge. The board seems
to have made a bad decision, and there is no reason why it should not
177
be held liable if that decision was a negligent one.
3.

Application to Questions of Executive Compensation

What sort of a business judgment is the decision to provide for a
certain sort of pay package for a corporate executive? In practice,
decisions on executive compensation are delegated to a compensation
178
committee rather than being addressed by the board as a whole. The
175. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious PoJ+er.·
La~ Nonns, and the Self-Goveming Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619, 1672 (2001)
(characterizing the board's decision as "a pretty dumb one"); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting
RealAbout Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 645,657 n.33 (2002) (characterizing the board's decision as having cost the company
$8 million); Eric Talley; Taking the '1'' Out of "Team':· Intra-Finn Monitoring and the
Conte11t of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CoRP. L. 1001, 1009 (1999) (characterizing the board's
decision as "almost certainly misguided"); Elliott J. Weiss, Teaching Accounting and
Valuation in the Basic Co1poration Law Course, 19 CARDOzo L. REv. 679, 691 (1997)
(noting that the board action did not serve shareholders interests, because "any investor
interested in American Express would have found it very easy to learn that American Express
had in fact incurred [a] loss" on its DLJ stock).
176. See K81i1in, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (''It is not enough to allege, as plaintiffs do here,
that the directors made an imprudent decision, which did not capitalize on the possibility of
using a potential capital loss to offset capital gains. More than imprudence or mistaken
judgment must be shown.").
177. Some scholars also point to Kamin as evidence that corporate managers are
encouraged to engage in questionable accounting practices. See, e.g., Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron 's Dark Shadows, 51
Bus. LAW~ 1421, 1447 (2002) C'The Kamin board's decision suggests that it was more
important to make decisions yielding superior accounting (maximizing income) than superior
economics (maximizing after-tax dollars)."); Gevurtz, supra note 28, at 1262 ("[T]he court
held that it was entirely appropriate . . . for the directors of American Express to cause the
company to lose millions of dollars for the sole purpose of improving reported earnings and
thereby maintaining the price at which the company's stock traded."); Daniel J.H. Greenwood,
Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting No1ms ofMarket, Agenc.;g Profit and
Loyalty, 10 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1226 & n.16 (2005) (describing the Kamin court as
condoning cooking the books to inflate the company's apparent value); Daniel J.H.
Greenwood, Enronitis: JVhy Good Corporations Go Bad, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 773,
821 n.89 ("[T]he [KatmiJ] court rested its decision solely on the astonishing rationale offered
by management: deceiving investors was good for them.").
178. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 24 ("Boards of large public companies
delegate to compensation committees the task of working out the critical details of executive
compensation arrangements."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There's a
Problem, Mat's the Remedy? The Case for "Compensation Discussion and Analysis, ,'30 J.
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compensation conunittee, in turn, relies on the advice of a
179
compensation expert. Those experts are hired through processes that
180
the CEO is able to influence. The chosen experts therefore have no
incentive to look out for shareholder interests and every incentive to
181
use their discretion in favor of executives. Often boards of directors
do not even meet with the consultants on whose opinions they
182
purportedly rely.
Directors speaking under conditions of anonymity acknowledge
the conflict of interest at the heart of the business of compensation
183
One noted that "consultants are hired by management.
experts.
184
They're going to be rehired by management." Another remarked that
"[t]he basic goal of compensation consultants is to justify whatever it
is the CEO wants to make. After all, who's going to recommend these
85
consultants to other CEOs?"'
The basic process seems to be fundamentally one-sided, with no
elements of input wei . · g in on the side of reining in executive pay.
When boards set compensation levels, they look to compensation
levels at firms they view as comparable, and they are unlikely to view

CORP. L. 675, 689 (2005) ("[B]oards increasingly have devolved the responsibility for

executive compensation to a specific compensation committee.").
179. Randall S. Thomas, Explaining the Intemational CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture
or Market Driven?, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1171, 1191 (2004) ("To assist it in performing its tasks,
the Compensation Committee will usually retain the services of an expert compensation
consultant.").
180. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 38 ("Typically, consultants have been
hired through a finn's human resources departrnent, and CEOs have often been involved in
the selection process.").
.
181. See id (noting consultants are not beholden in any way to shareholders and
"could only benefit from using their discretion to favor the CEO").
182. Rowtdtable, J.Vhats Wrong with Executive Compensation?, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.
2003, at 68, 71 (statement of John England, Compensation Consultant) ("But in almost 20
years of consulting at the board level, I've only seen a handful of conunittees regularly call
executive sessions with the compensation consultant.").
183. See Carol J. Loomis, (This StuffIs Wrong, 'FORTUNE, June 25,2001, at 73, 74.
184. Id
185. Id at 80; see Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed· Unintended
Consequences of Trying To Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88
MINN. L. REv. 1673, 1696 (2004) ("Without compensation committees composed solely of
independent directors who assess the worth of the company's executives at arm's length,
compensation caps will simply be circumvented with the assistance of creative lawyers,
accountants, and compensation experts~"); Mark A. Salky, Comment, The Regulatory
Regimes for Controlling Excessive Executive Compensation: Are Both, Either, or Neither
Necessary?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 795, 800 (1995) ("Essentially, CEOs set their own salaries
through the use of a submissive board of directors as well as clever compensation consultants
who draft compensation packages aroWld the various restraints established for curbing
excessive pay.").
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the CEO they want to hire or retain as merely average.
As one
former CEO put it, "[t]he main reason compensation increases every
year is that most boards want their CEO to be in the top half of the
CEO peer group, because they think it makes the company look
187
strong."
Even those who seek refonn of executive compensation offer few
strategies that would change the dynamic whereby corporate
executives sit on corporate boards and pay their peers salaries in line
188
with what they in turn would want to be paid. And the problem of
executive compensation only becomes worse with the advent of
generous options packages. As one fornter executive summarized his
expenence:
•

Let's say a board is discussing whether to award the CEO options on 2
million shares. During the conversation, somebody points out that the
options aren't going to be an expense, so they won't cost the company
an · g when they're granted. Someone else picks up on that and
189
says, "In that case, why not give the CEO options on 4 million?"

Some have placed hope for reform in the advent of independent
compensation committees, but people with experience on corporate
b·oards dismiss the notion that boards or compensation committees can
190
truly be independent of CEOs.
In designing pay packages, consultants draw on nonpublic pay
data companies make available to them and they agree to keep .
191
The companies have an incentive to share this
confidential.
information with compensation consultants because the information
assists the consultants in improving the design of executive

186. Gordon, supra note 178, at 687.
187. Whats Wrong with Executive Compensation?, supra note 182, at 72 (statement
of Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., former CEO of DuPont).
188. See id at 70 (statement of Eric Roiter, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Fidelity Mgmt. & Research Co.) ("The test might be based on benchmarks for peer
groups and adjusted to temper the spread between the pay of the most senior officers and that
of the rnnk and file.").
189. Id (statement of Peter Clapman, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel for
Investments, TIAA-CREF).
190. See id at 71 ("Ultimately, the CEOs of public corporations still have a lot of
power over the process, over the selection of directors, over the decisions of compensation
committees."); id at 72 (statement of Edgar S. Woolard, Jr.) (characterizing as a "myth" the
notion that compensation committees are independent); see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra
note 47, at 81 (noting that large boards, having outside directors who sit on multiple boards,
and interlocking directorates all make it less likely that the board will be independent of the
CEO).
191. See Mats Wrong with Executive Compensation?, supra note 182, at 70.
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192

compensation. Thus, when boards rely on compensation experts to
set executive compensation, their decision does not involve any
confidential information relating to the company on whose board they
sit. In fact, such decisions are usually based on information relating to
other companies. In such circumstances, litigation challenging board
decisions regarding executive pay does not threaten the corporation
with forced disclosure of prospective business plans, and the Rule
should not apply.

B

The Rule and the Disney Litigation
.

.

The growth of executive pay in the United States since the 1990s
has been simply breathtaking. In 1991, the average large-company
CEO outearned the average worker by a factor of 140; by 2003, the
193
ratio was 500: I.
Although executives account for a very small
percentage of a corporation's employees, their compensation accounts
194
for a large portion of a corporation's expenditures. Between 1998
and 2002, the 1500 companies in the ExecuComp database paid about
195
$100 billion to their top 5 executives. In 2003, compensation to the
top 5 executives in all public companies in the previous 3 years
196
equaled 10% of those companies' earnings.
A 1992 study found that, going back to 1900, courts have almost
never overturned decisions relating to compensation for executives at
197
publicly traded companies. As of 1996, there were almost no rulings
by appellate courts affirming an order to reduce executive
198
compensation at a public company based on a theory of waste.
There is considerable evidence that boards are never really actually
independent when they decide on executive compensation, and so the
most straightforward argument against the use of the Rule in the
context of executive compensation is simply that even under traditional
justifications of the Rule, the fact that most board members are
beholden to the CEO creates a conflict of interest that should preclude

192. Jd
193. BEBCHUK& FRJED, supm note 47, at 1.
194. Bainbridge, supmnote 112, at 1619.
195. Jd
196. Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Every Underachiever, An Ove1paid Board?, N.Y.
Tnvrns, Jan. 22, 2006, § 3, at 1.
197. Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 81-82 (1992).
198. Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposal for (Further) Refo1m, 50 SMU L. Rev. 20 l, 214-15 ( 1996).

2007]

BUSINESS JUDGMENT.R ULE

873

199

the use of the Rule. Even defenders of high executive compensation
acknowledge that the problem of structural bias in favor of high
compensation is intractable:
We are dealing with people; by and large, who know one another and
have cotmnon experiences, and it's not an environment likely·to foster a
great deal of independence· from the CEO among board members~ And
in trying to create independence, you do not want to create an
200
adversarial relationship.

However, courts have repeatedly rejected plaintiffs' claims that the
Rule should not be applied to executive compensation cases based on
201
directors' professional indebtedness to the CE0.
Making the Rule inapplicable to decisions relating to executive
compensation is not the only solution to the problem of executive pay.
Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
202
proposed new disclosure rules relating to executive pay. Others have
suggested the SEC go further and require shareholder approval of the
203
pay packages the SEC would require corporations to disclose. But

199. See BEBCHUK & FRIED~ supra note 47, at 27-J6 (identifYing CEOs' power to
benefit directors through interlocking boards, and the CEO power to set levels of director
compensation, social and psychological factors that prevent directors from challenging
CEOs, and the small cost to directors of favoring executives preventing arms-length
negotiation of executive compensation).
200. Whats wrong with Executive Compensation?, supm note 182, at 71 (statement
of Joe Bachelder, Executive Compensation Lawyer, Bachelder Law Fim1); see BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra·note 41, at 80 (s
· · g factors that increase CEO influence over a board).
20 l. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693; 761 n.488 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (noting that Disney CEO, Michael Eisner; surrounded
himself with "yes men" and "non-employee directors who would have sycophantic
tendencies" but nonetheless concluding that the board had exercised independent judgment).
In a recent shareholder derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duty based on a failure
of oversight by the board of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, the Delaware Supreme Court
found demand was not excused because a majority of the directors were independent of
Martha Stewart despite the fact that they had long been friends with her and/or done business
with her~ Beam ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc.~ Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1050-55 (Del. 2004). But see Pereira v: Cogan, 294 B.R. 449,517, 52R (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding directors liable for failure of oversight of executive compensation after fmding the
corporation's two-member compensation committee lacked independence). See generally
Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committee~ and the Vagaries of
Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. RE'l 1305, 1310 (2005) ("The overwhelming majority of
courts ... have rejected the structural-bias concept.'').
202. See Stephen Labaton, S.E C To Require More Disclosure ofExecutive Pay, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at AI (reporting proposed new rules would require public corporations
to provide "a figure for total compensation, including significant perks, stock options and
retirement benefits" for the five top-paid executives).
203. Gordon, supra note 178, at 693-701 (calling on the SEC to require proxy
disclosure of a "Compensation Discussion and Analysis" and urging consideration of a
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there seems to be little hope that such reforms will have a large impact
204
on executive pay.
1.

The Problem of Pay Without Performance

As their critics acknowledge, Harvard's Lucian Bebchuk and
Berkeley's Jesse Fried (and their collaborators) have made a significant
205
contribution to our understanding of executive compensation. Their
fundamental insight is that "[t]he absence of effective arm's-length
dealing under today's system of corporate governance ... has been the
206
primary source of problematic compensation arrangements."
One
consequence of the fact that executive compensation does not result
from arm's-length negotiations is that executive cash compensation
"has been at best weakly correlated with finns' industry-adjusted
perforn1ance" and other forms of executive compensation, including
favorable loans, pensions, deferred compensation, and perks, "have
207
tended to be insensitive to managerial performance." In fact, one
recent study found highly paid CEOs who run large fmns and are not
subject to monitoring by large shareholders perform worse than their
208
more poorly paid peers.
tion packages are extraoli · · y
The fact that executive com
209
generous does not necessarily mean that they are excessive.
shareholder approval vote on that disclosure, a practice recently adopted in the United
Kingdom).
204. See Labaton, supra note 202, at Al (noting proposed new SEC rules are not
expected to have much of an impact on executive pay).
205. Gordon, supra note 178, at 677 (articulating concerns about Bebchuk and Fried's
book); Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1618 ("[Bebchuk and Fried's text] makes a significant
and valuable contribution to the literature by synthesizing and systematizing the managerialist
account of executive compensation."); William W Bratton, The Academic Tournament over
Executive Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REv. 1557, 1561 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRJED,
supra note 47) (acknowledging the reform called for by Bebchuk and Fried will not occur
anytime soon but praising their "robust criticism'' of current boardroom practices); John E.
Core et al., Is US. CEO Compensation Ineflicient Pay Without Perfonnance?, 103 MICH. L.
REv. 1142, 1142 (2005) (reviewing same) ("Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried
develop and summarize the leading critiques of cw-rent executive compensation practices in
the United States." (footnotes omitted)).
206. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at ix.
207. Id at 7; see Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the
Managena.J Power and Optimal Contracting Theories ofExecutive Compensation, 30 J. CoRP.
L. 255, 290 (2005) (concluding that managerial power over directors dramatically impacts
executive compensation).
208. Lewis A. Kornhauser et al., lhe Good, the Bad and the Lucky: CEO Pay and
Ski/16 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, No. 9, 2005),
available athttp://lsr.nellco.org/nyullewp/papers/9.
209. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 8 (distinguishing their approach from
"moral," "fairness-based," or "populist" opposition to high executive compensation). But see
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However, from the perspective of this Article, it does not matter
whether it makes sense generally for executives to be generously
compensated. What matters is that executive compensation constitutes
a significant corporate expenditure.. The question. is whether there is
any reason to use the Rule to protect directors who make poor
decisions regarding executive compensation from liability in
connection with those decisions. From that perspective-, Bebchuk and
Fried's work on the disconnect between executive pay and performance
is of great significance, even if we believe that highly competent or
successful executives are entitled to extremely generous compensation
packages.
Bebchuk and. Fried have identified four ways in which standard
executive compensation contracts create perverse incentives and
reward executives regardless of performance, while preventing
210
shareholders from knowing the details of executive compensation.
Boards that approve such executive contracts should not be pennitted
the deference accorded to other sorts of decisions under the Rule.
First, executive compensation contracts now routinely reward
executives for reporting higher earnings, creating an incentive for
211
executives to boost their numbers. However, when, as in the case of
Fannie Mae, those numbers turn out to be grossly misstated, executive
compensation contracts do not provide for a downward adjustment of
212
compensation commensurate with the overstatement of eat"nings.
Second, executives who resign in disgrace receive extremely generous
compensation packages, as long as they have not been fired for
''cause;' a term that is narrowly defined in standard executive
213
'fhird, largely in order to avoid the tax
compensation contracts.
Gordon, supra note 178, at 677 (contending that the outrage caused by executive
compensation is not explained by the disconnect between pay and performance alone).
210. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 126, at 807-08 (outlining four problems with
Fannie Mae's executive pay arrangements).
211. Id at 809-12.
212. Jdat8l0.
213. Jd at 812. For example, Fannie Mae's CEO, Franklin Raines, who was dismissed
in an accounting scandal, received a retirement package worth at least $32 million. Id
Fannie Mae ~s CFO, Timothy Howard, received a $6 million pension. Id The authors note
that "poor operating petformance, deception, or earnings manipulation that falls short of the
legal definition of fraud are not groWlds for a for cause tennination" under Raines and
Howard's contracts. Jd Moreover; under Fannie Mae executives' contracts, had they been
dismissed for "cause," Raines' severance package would have been reduced by only $7
million and Howard's package would not have been reduced at all. Id at 813; see In re Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 759 (DeL Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 .A.2d 27 (Del.
2006) (upholding the board's determination that Michael Ovitz could not be terminated "for
cause'').
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implications of nonperformance-based executive salaries in excess of
214
$1 million, corporations circt1n1vent this limit by providing generous
215
retirement benefits that are not linked to performance.
Finally, corporations use postretirement payments to camouflage
216
large amounts of compensation that are not based on performance.
[C]ompensation arrangements have often been designed with an eye to
camouflaging rent and minimizing outrage. Finns have systematically
taken steps that make less transparent both the total amount of
compensation and the extent to which it is decoupled from n1anagers'
own perfortnance. Managers' interest in reduced transparency has been
served by the design of numerous compensation practices, such as
postretirement perks and consulting arrangements, deferred
217
compensation, pension plans, and executive loans.

In the context of executive compensation, the camouflage argument is
218
the best response to the corporate sovereignty defense of the Rule.
Boards cannot be held accountable to shareholders if they do not
disclose the nature of executive compensation, and when they design
executive contracts so as to circumvent shareholder oversight, they
should not be entitled to the protections of the Rule. But retirement
payments are not the only aspect of executive compensation that is
camouflaged. "[U]ntil very recently, SEC rules haven't required
companies to disclose the scope or even the existence of option plans
219
that haven't been approved by shareholders."

2.

Application in the Disney Case

In January 1997, plaintiffs brought a claitn against Disney and its
directors for a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the hiring of
Ovitz to be Disney's President in 1995 and in connection with the
214. I.R.C. § l62(m) (2000).
215. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 47, at 92-93; Bebchuk & Fried, supm note 126, at
816; Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Stealth Compensation via Retirement Benefits,
I BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 291, 295 (2004).
216. BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 47, at 95-111; Bebchuk & Fried, supmnote 126, at
816-21; Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 215, at 316-19.
217. BEBCHUK& FRIED, supra note 47, at 6.
218. The camouflage argument does not only apply to the question of executive
compensation. As Gevurtz has suggested, the Kamin court applied the Rule to prevent
American Express directors from facing liability for issuing a dividend to shareholders that
prevented the company from realizing an $8 million tax savings. Gevurtz, supra note 28, at
i267-68. Worse still, the court never questioned the business practice that cost shareholders
$8 million that was to hide a significant loss on a failed investment rather than disclosing the
loss. Jd
219. Roundtable, supra note 182, at 71 (statement of Jamie Heard, CEO, Institutional
Shareholder Servs. ).
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Disney board's approval of a $140 million severance payment in
220
connection with Ovitz's termination late in 1996. The case has now
221
been argued twice before the Delaware Supreme Court. Its facts and
history illustrate the problems with utilizing the Rule to shield
directors from liability challenges to a board's approval of executive
compensation plans.
.

a.

.

.

The Facts of the DisneyCase

In late sununer 1995, Disney CEO, Michael Eisner, and Ovitz
negotiated an Employment Agreement (the OEA) whereby Ovitz, who
222
was a close friend of Eisner, would become President of Disney and

Eisner's second-in-connnand. The only members of Disney's board of
directors who were infonned of and participated in the negotiations
were.hwin Russell, who was then chairman of Disney's compensation
conunittee, and Raymond Watson, another member of the
223
Russell was also Eisner's personal
compensation committee.
224
A compensation expert, Graef Crystal, was consulted
attorney.
during the negotiations, performed various calculations, and prepared
spreadsheets evaluating the compensation packages being considered
225
Eisner's employment agreement, along with that of
for Ovitz.
226
Ovitz's predecessor, Frank Wells, served as a template for the OEA.
Russell cautioned that Ovitz's level of compensation and the number
of stock options being offered to hitn went "far beyond the standards
227
Crystal also
applied within Disney and corporate America."
expressed concern about the magnitude of Ovitz's pay package, as well

220. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A~2d 244, 248-49 (Del. 2000) (summarizing plaintiffs'
claims: (I) the Disney board breached its fiduciary duty in approving an "extravagant and
wasteful Employment Agreement'' with Ovitz; (2) the Disney board breached its fiduciary
duty in agreeing to an "extravagant and wasteful" nonfault termination of Ovitz; and (3) the
directors were not disinterested and independent).
221 .. The case was affumed by the Delaware Supreme Court on June 8, 2006. In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
222. Sec Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249; In rc Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d
693, 699-706 (Del. Ch. 2005); aff'd, 906 A.2d 27.
223. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 702.
224. Id at 747 n.488.
225. ld at 704-05.
226. Id at 703.
227. Id at 704.

878

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:829

228

as the incentives it created. It appears Russell and Crystal's concerns
229
were ·never shared with Disney's board of directors .
On August 14th, 1995, having discussed the matter with only a
few members of Disney's board of directors, Eisner entered into a
letter agreement with Ovitz (OLA), outlining the basic terms of his
230
employment.
Although the OLA provided that it was subject to
approval by the compensation committee and the board, Disney issued
a press release the day the OLA was signed, making Ovitz's hiring a
231
matter of public knowledge.
Ovitz was hired over the strenuous
objections of at least three of Disney's inside directors, and Ovitz's
hiring was therefore made conditional on his concession that two of his
232
supposed subordinates would report directly to Eisner.
The terms of Ovitz's employment were approved during a onehour meeting of-Disney's compensation committee at which it was one
233
of five matters on the agenda.
Crystal did not attend the meeting,
and neither the OEA nor his analysis of the OEA were distributed to
234
the compensation committee.
Instead, Russell and Watson
235
Sllmtnarized Crystal's analysis. The compensation committee did not
consider the following terms of the OEA:
(1) the purchase of Ovitz's private jet for $187,000 over the appraised
value; (2) the purchase of Ovitz's BMW at acquisition cost and not the
depreciated market value; (3) the purchase of Ovitz's computers at
replacement value instead of their lower book value; (4) any specific list
of perquisites, despite ·Eisner already agreeing to provide Ovitz with
nwnerous such benefits; and (5) that despite Ovitz's bonus being
payable completely on a discretionary basis, Russell's memorandum to
228. See id at 705 (''Crystal was philosophically opposed to a pay package that would
give Ovitz the best of both worlds ie., low risk and high return.").
229. Only Eisner heard of Russell's concerns. See id at 704 ("Russell did not provide
this Case Study [outlining the OEA parameters] to any other member of Disney's board of
directors."); id at 705-06 ("Crystal's letter was never circulated to any board member other
than Eisner~").
230. Id at 707.
231. Id at 708.
232. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 250 (Del. 2000) ("When Eisner told three
members of the Old Board in mid-August 1995 that h~ had decided to hire Ovitz, all three
'denounced the decision."'); In re Disney, 907 A.2d 693, 706 (reporting that Disney's General
Counsel and Chief Operating Officer Sanford Litvack and Chief Financial Officer Stephen
Bollenbach immediately made it clear that they would not report to Ovitz but would continue
to report to Eisner).
233. In re Disney, 907 A.2d 693, 708. One of those items was the approval of a
$250,000 payment to Russell for his role in negotiating Ovitz's contract. Appellants' Opening
Brief, supra note 62, at 11.
234. In re Disney, 901 A.2d 693, 709.
235. Id
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Ovitz indicating that the bonus would likely approximate $7.5 million
236
annually.

Immediately after the compensation committee meeting, Disney's
board of directors heard Watson explain his analysis of the OEA, and
237
he and Russell responded to the board's questions on the matter. The
238
board then voted unanimously to elect Ovitz as Disney's president.
Although there is some dispute as to this matter, the court
concluded that Eisner was generally positive about Ovitz's
239
performance during his first few months at Disney.
However,
240
matters deteriorated quickly in 1996.
By the fall of 1996, it was
241
clear to all but Ovitz that he had no future at Disney. The OEA
provided for three possible ways by which Ovitz might be terminated:
He might serve his five years and Disney might decide against offering
him a new contract. If so, Disney would owe Ovitz a $10 million
termination payment. Before the end of the initial term, Disney could
terminate Ovitz for "good cause" only if Ovitz committed gross
negligence or malfeasance, or if Ovitz resigned voluntarily. Disney
would owe Ovitz no additional compensation if it tem1inated hirn for
"good cause." Termination without cause (non-fault tennination) would
entitle Ovitz to the present value of his remaining salary payments
through September 30, 2000, a $10 million severance payment, an
additional $7.5 million for each fiscal year remaining under the
agreement, and the immediate vesting of the frrst 3 million stock
242
options (the ''A" Options).

Eisner had General Counsel and Chief Operating Officer Sanford
Litvack look into the possibility of terminating Ovitz for cause, but he
243
and Litvack both concluded that cause was lacking. It is not clear
that the issue of for-cause termination was ever raised with Disney's
244
board.

236. Jd at 709 n.85.
237. Jd at 710.
238. Id
239. See id at 713 n.120 (citing three letters from Eisner written late in 1995
indicating Eisner's favorable impressions of Ovitz's performance at that time and rmding not
credible the contrary testimony of Sid Bass, then Disney's largest shareholder).
240. ld at 724.
241. Jd
242. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 250 (Del. 2000) (footnote omitted).
243. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 728-29.
244. See id at 731 (noting that "there is some controversy as to whether any details of
the NFf and the cause question were discussed" at the November 25, 1996, executive session
at which Eisner announced his intention to fire Ovitz by year's end).
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After reviewing the various accounts of Ovitz's performance, the
court concluded there were "three competing theories as to why Ovitz
245
was not successful."
However, for the purposes of determining
whether defendants could be held liable for breach of the duty of care
in connection with Ovitz's hiring and frring, the court remarked that "it
makes no difference why Ovitz was not as successful as his reputation
would have led many to expect, so long as he was not grossly negligent
246
or malfeasant."
The court relegated to the footnotes the testimony most relevant
to plaintiffs' claim that defendants breached their fiduciary duties and
committed waste by paying Ovitz a severance package worth
approximately $140 million based on a no-fault termination (NFT)
when there was evidence Ovitz justifiably could have been terminated
for cause. For example, Eisner wrote of Ovitz: "I do not trust hi1n.
None of the people he works with feels comfortable with his directness
and honesty. . . . The biggest problem is that nobody trusts him, for he
247
cannot tell the truth.'' The court suggested that this writing did not
reflect Eisner's true feelings about Ovitz because it was written shortly
248
after Eisner's mother's death. In a later letter, explaining the reasons
for Ovitz's tertnination, which was drafted but never sent to Ovitz,
Eisner wrote, "When we talked last Friday, I told you again that my
biggest problem was that you played the angles too much. I told you
98% of the problem was that I did not know when you were telling the
249
truth, about big things, about small things ...."
Still, the court
adopted a benign reading of-Eisner's view of Ovitz; namely, that Ovitz
had a tendency to engage in "salesmanship" or "agenting" and would
250
thus stretch the truth in order to get his way.
After Ovitz's termination was announced, Eisner sent an e-mail to
Disney's head of public relations in which he called Ovitz "totally
245. Id at 718.
246. Id
247. ld at 720 n.l86.
248. Id at 720.
249. Id at 727. The opinion omitted '"exaggerated the truth too far, manipulated me
and others too much.'" Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at I. The court omits the
next sentence: "'And while you were telling me that those dishonest days were over, you
were deceiving me on a specific matter.'" ld at 17. The court discounts the significance of
this letter because Eisner characterized it as '"not accurate, way exaggerated, silly,
hyperbole.'" In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 727. Eisner wrote the letter as part of an attempt to
"put Ovitz on notice that he was no longer welcome at Disney." Id However, the letter
indicates that Eisner spoke with Ovitz about his veracity problems on several occasions. See
Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at 17 ('"As we've discussed many times, we all
never knew when you were telling things the way they were."').
250. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 720.
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251

incompetent" and a "psychopath." Although at trial Eisner claims he
did not even know what the words in the letter meant (a claim the court
252
found persuasive), the letter is actually quite clear on Eisner's
understanding of the word "psychopath": "'He is a psychopath
(Doesn't know right from wrong), cannot tell the truth. Basically he
has a character problem, too devious, too untrustworthy to everybody,
253
and only out for hirnself. "' Similarly, Litvack testified that "Ovitz
would 'handle' Litvack and 'put his spin on things,"' but the court
noted the worst lies Litvack could remember were trivial fibs like: "'I
was on the phone with someone important and couldn't be on time for
254
the meeting.''' The court concluded there was no concrete evidence
that Ovitz ever told a material falsehood and the trivial statements
attributed to Ovitz by Litvack did not suffice to constitute gross
negligence or malfeasance, the standard necessary for termination "for
ca\J1Se."2ss
On December 10, 1996, Disney's Executive Perfortnance Plan
Committee met. Russell recornn1ended Ovitz be granted a $7.5
256
million bonus despite his poor performance.
No member of the
committee objected to this suggestion, apparently because they were
under the impression that Disney was obligated to pay Ovitz a bonus,
257
although the OEA clearly states the bonus is discretionary. Two days
later, Disney issued a press release announcing that Ovitz would leave
258
the company, effective January 31, 1997.
At that point, "[T]he
Disney board had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the
termination . . . and few if any directors did an independent
259
investigation of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause."

251. Id at 738.
252. Id (quoting Ovitz as describing the letter "as his effort at 'venting' and that
'although [he] didn't know what the words meant, [he] was just so angry"'). Though Eisner's
evaluation of Ovitz as a psychopath may not rise to the level of an authoritative clinical
diagnosis, his letter makes his meaning very clear, and Eisner's evaluation ofOvitz's character
is significant whether or not he used the ternt "psychopath" correctly. If Eisner does not
know what the term ''totally incompetent" means, one wonders why a court should defer to
his business judgment as to whether Ovitz could have been terminated for cause.
25 3. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at 17.
254. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 720.
255. ld at 720 n.19l.
256. ld at 734.
257. Id On December 20, 1996, Disney's Executive Perfonnance Plan Committee
met for the sole purpose of rescinding Ovitz's bonus. Eisner then accelerated Ovitz's
departure date to December 27, 1996. Id at 739.
258. Id at 735.
259. Id at 736.
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Ovitz subsequently was awarded a severance package worth
260
approximately $140 million.
Crystal later said that no one ever
bothered to work out the numbers on the severance provisions in the·
261
OEA. If they had, according to plaintiffs, they would have noticed
that the OEA set up perverse incentives for Ovitz, permitting him to
make more money if he left Disney pursuant to the NFT provision of
the OEA than he could if he stayed in his position for the full five-year
262
term. Crystal described Ovitz's severance package under the OEA
263
as "shocking."
b.

The Misplaced Rule

Because the Rule, bolstered by the liability protection provided by
§ 102(b)(7) of Delaware's General Corporation Law, applied to this
case, the court found that the standard applicable to the review of the
defendants' decisions relating to the hiring and firing of Ovitz was
good faith: "[T]he concept of intentional dereliction of duty; a
conscious disregard for ones responsib1lities, is an appropriate
(although not the only) standard for detennining whether fiduciaries
264
have acted in good faith." The court, thus constrained by existing
jurisprudence, was compelled to find that the defendants could not be
held liable, though the Chancellor felt compelled to point out the
enormous gulf separating the conduct of the Disney board from ideal
265
practices. The court was especially harsh in its characterization of
Michael Eisner's management style:
260. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 248-49 (Del. 2000).
261. See id. at 251 (quoting Crystal as stating that '"no one added up the total cost of
the severance package"'); id at 261 (
· ing the complaint as alleging that "neither
Crystal nor the Old Board made the calculations that Crystal-the expert now believes he
should have made").
262. Id; see In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 759 (noting the plaintiffs' expert witness opined
that the OEA "improperly incentivized Ovitz to leave the Company and receive an NFT,
rather than complete the tenn of the OEA").
263. Brehm, 7 46 A.2d at 251. Chancellor Chandler described the severance payments
as "breathtaking." In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 698.
264. In re Disney, 907 A.2d at 755.
265. See, e.g., id. at 760 ("For the future, many lessons of what not to do can be
learned from defendants' conduct here."); id at 760 n.487 (describing the board as "supine or
passive"); id. at 761 n.488 ("[T]he board's collective kowtowing in regard to Ovitz's hiring is
also due to Eisner's desire to surround himself with yes men."); id (giving examples of
"Eisner's success at surrounding himself with non-employee directors who would have
sycophantic tendencies"); id at 763 (speaking of Eisner as "having enthroned himself as the
omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic Kingdom"); id at 764 (remarking
that it would have been better if Russell had sought to verify Ovitz 's representations as to his
income from his finn, Creative Artists Agency); id. at 769-70 (suggesting it would have been
better if the compensation committee had entertained a formal presentation from Crystal
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By virtue of his Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO ... ,
Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that
infected and handicapped the board's decisionmaking abilities. Eisner
stacked his (and I intentionally write "his" as opposed to "the
Company's") board of directors with friends and other acquaintances
who, though not necessarily beholden to him in a legal sense, were
certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support him
266
unconditionally than truly independent directors.

Although fmding that Eisner acted neither with gross negligence nor
in bad faith, the court noted many lapses in Eisner's conduct in
connection with Ovitz's hiring:
He failed to keep the board as informed as he should have. He
stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by acting
without specific board direction or involvement. He prematurely issued
a press release that placed significant pressure on the board to accept
Ovitz and approve his compensation package in accordance with the
267
press release.

In sum, the court concluded, Eisner's conduct did not "comport with
268
how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act."
With respect to the rest of the board, the court did not find their
conduct in connection with Ovitz's hiring commendable, but it did not
269
violate any fiduciary duty. Similarly, with respect to the decision to
pennit Ovitz's NFT, Disney's corporate charter pennitted the board to
delegate authority to make decisions in such matters to Eisner, and, so
they could not have violated any duty in connection with that
270
Invoking the divergence of standards of conduct and
termination.
standards of care, the court concluded: "[T]he standards used to
measure the conduct of fiduciaries under Delaware law are not the
271
same standards used in determining good corporate govemance."
The case provides a telling illustration of the divergence of
standards of conduct and standards of review under the Rule, first
272
identified by Eisenberg. In its August 2005 opinion dismissing the
complaint on all counts, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that
before the board relied on his analysis); id at 771 (conceding that directors Poitier and
Lozano "may appear casual or uninfottned").
266. Id at 760-61 (footnote omitted).
267. Id at 762-63.
268. ld at 763.
269. Id at 772.
270. ld at 776.
271. Id at 772
272. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 440-44.
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"there are many aspects of defendants' conduct that fell significantly
273
The
short of the best practices of ideal corporate govemance."
question is, in contexts such as the Disney compensation case, does
granting directors the benefits of the Rule help the corporation or help
shareholders? The clear answer is the Rule accomplishes neither goal,
even if we believe that, despite the bad outcome in this case, the board
did the right thing in: (a) hiring (or approving the hiring of) Ovitz to
be its President, (b) approving the OEA that provided for a $140
million severance payment to Ovitz after only 14 months in office, and
(c) determining that Ovitz could not be frred for cause. That is, hiring
Ovitz might have looked like a good idea for Disney in 1995 and
offering him a generous severance package might have been necessary
given that Ovitz was giving up his share in a very profitable
274
partnership. A court could also conclude that the Disney directors
engaged in a reasonable inquiry and properly concluded that Ovitz
could not be fired for cause in 1996.
But the Rule does not permit a court to engage in such a
reasonable inquiry. Instead, a court has to excuse what it recognizes as
misconduct on the part of corporate directors, whether or not that
misconduct results in hartn to the corporation and its shareholders:
"Eisner's failure to better involve the board in the process of Ovitz's
hiring, usurping that role for himself . . . does not comport with how
275
fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act." Moreover,
because courts treat the Rule as creating an evidentiary preswnption or
as a standard of review, it does nothing to protect corporations (and
their shareholders) from the reputational harms that accompany
protracted litigation. The corporation is thus subjected to years of
costly litigation, including a humiliating trial in which Disney's
corporate governance practices were inspected under a microscope.
The corporation has spent years embroiled in litigation that is
expensive in attorneys' fees, resources, morale, and reputational harm,
and the shareholders will not see any upside to all the Sturm und
Drangto which the corporation is thereby subjected.
The Disney case highlights the disastrous consequences the
deployment of the Rule can have in the context of shareholder
challenges to executive pay. First, the problem nicely illustrates the
ways in which executive compensation packages can include NFT
2 73. In re Disney, 901 A.2d at 697.
274. Jd at 701 (stating that the success of Ovitz's business "translated into an annual
income of $20 million for Ovitz").
275. Id at 763.
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clauses that protect executives' generous severance packages in almost
276
all circt1mstances.
Such clauses not only protect executives'
interests; they protect boards from having to concede that they
authorized generous salaries, retirement, and postretirement benefits to
incompetent managers or to managers whose improprieties do not
quite rise to the level of actionable fraud. The fact that no one at a
corporation could work with an executive because they found him
completely untrustworthy should be grounds for tennination for cause,
and a court should be permitted to investigate whether a board that
approves a contract that does not permit for termination for cause in
such circt1mstances should be held liable for negligence.
The Disney board's conduct in hiring Ovitz illustrates Bebchuk
and Fried's argument about how one-sided the process of executive
277
hiring_can be. Eisner and Ovitz had been friends for twenty-five
278
years when Eisner recruited Ovitz for Disney.
Because Eisner's
compensation package would have to be at least as generous as that of
his subordinate, Eisner and the board he controlled had every reason to
make Ovitz's compensation package as generous as possible. Eisner's
279
personal lawyer, Russell, negotiated on behalf of Disney, and Russell
280
was paid $250,000 for his role in closing the deal with Ovitz. He
thus became invested in the transaction and would naturally be
inclined to support it. Tenns of Ovitz's compensation package were
cat11ouflaged to such an extent that even those who created them did
not recognize the potential they entailed for creating perverse
81
incentives} In such circumstances, shareholders could not possibly
have been reasonably well infonned of the terms of Ovitz's
compensation package. In the context of executive compensation, the
Rule precludes a court from even considering whether structural bias
on ,a board such as, Disney's led directors to prioritize- their own
interests in the-transaction and their own ties to Eisner and Ovitz over
their duties to Disney and its shareholders.
The Disney case also illustrates why the Rule-, conceived as an
abstention doctrine designed to protect corporations from disclosure of
confidential infort11ation relating to its prospective business plans,
276. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 126, at 812 (noting narrow def'"tnitions of "for
cause" termination are now standard in executive employment contracts).
277. SeeBEBCHUK&FRIED, supra note 47, at 2.
278. In re J)isney, 901 A.2d at 699.
279. Id at 761 n.488.
280. Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 62, at 11.
281. Seeln re Disney, 907 A.2d at 760 (stating that the board members were ordinarily
negligent in the hiring ofOvitz and the approval ofthe OEA).
.

.

.
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should have no application to cases involving challenges to executive
compensation. While the decision to hire Ovitz might have been
related to such prospective business plans, the contours of his
compensation were determined with reference to standard pay
packages for executives at other corporations and with reference to the
pay for other Disney executives. Disney would suffer no irreparable
harm from the disclosure of such information, and, of course, the
information comes out anyway in litigation in which the Rule operates
as a standard of review or as an evidentiary presumption.
The director-primacy model contends that the organizational
efficiencies of the corporation better achieve the aim of shareholder
wealth maximization through authority-based, decision-making
processes than would a consensual shareholder-primacy model that
282
pennits shareholder action to trump board action.
Shareholder
283
But
action is rare, as the director-primacy model acknowledges.
shareholder action is rare because, in most circumstances, shareholders
would rather switch than fight recognizing that individual
shareholders gain more from moving their money out of a poorly
managed corporation and into a better one than from seeking to
improve the management of a corporation in which they have invested
284
On the rare occasions when
through shareholder litigation.
shareholders are moved to challenge board action, absent a claim that
the corporation will be damaged in the discovery process, a court
should be permitted to determine when a board takes an action that is
not in the interests of the corporation. The Ovitz transaction may or
may not have been in the interests of Disney. The Rule prevents the
Delaware courts from making any such determination, and, so
deployed, the Rule impedes the adjudication of shareholder rights and
interests, prevents shareholder actions from constraining boards,
promotes board passivity, and thus permits negligent boards to cause
economic harm to corporations and their shareholders.
Finally, as demonstrated in the Disney litigation, the Rule pertnits
officers and directors to tread very delicately near the line that
separates poor management from wasteful mismanagement and
282. See Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 572 (touting the authority-based structure of the
corporation as its "chief economic virtue"); Bainbridge, supra note 112, at 1654 (noting
shareholder power undennines the purpose of authority-based, decision-making structures
which achieve efficiency by concentrating discretionary authority in the board).
283. Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 557-58.
284. See id (discussing shareholders' "rational apathy"); Romano, supra note 82, at 55
(noting the cost of bringing suit "is typically greater than a shareholder-plaintiff's pro rata
benefit'').
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thereby nullifies any incentive they might have to perform better. In
the. case of decisions relating to executive pay, there is no reason why
directors should not be liable for breaches of the duty of care under the
generally applicable standard of care: '•[T]he care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances."285 The purpose of imposing personal liability on directors for
breaches of their duties of care and loyalty is to align their incentives
286
with shareholders' interests. To the extent the Rule interferes with
the achievement of this goal, it undercuts the main thrust of reforms in
corporate governance since the 1990s, which has sought further to
287
align officers' and directors' incentives with those of shareholders.
.

N.

.

.

.

.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this Article has been two-fold. First, the Article seeks
to demonstrate existing rationales for the Rule are unsatisfactory and
the two most cormnon understandings of the Rule, the Rule as
evidentiary presumption and the Rule as standard of review, lead
courts to engage in substantive review of board decisions in
circumstances where they really ought to abstain from any such
review. Both of these problems regarding dominant understandings of
the Rule derive from a tendency to view the Rule as a means of
protecting the corporations' directors rather than as a mechanism for
protecting corporations themselves from hanns they might suffer
through litigation.
Second, the Article proposes a new rationale for the Rule: the
Rule ought to be deployed as an abstention doctrine to preclude a court
from undertaking substantive review of a_board's decisions when
challenges to those decisions would require the corporation to disclose
its prospective business plans. The Article suggests the Rule would
thus often apply in the context of decisions relating to acquisitions and
mergers and to the issuance of dividends, but it would rarely apply in
the context of shareholder challenges to decisions relating to executive
compensation. As illustrated in the recent litigation relating to
Disney's hiring and firing of Ovitz, such decisions do not implicate
any long-term plans of the corporation, and the corporation is not
285. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT§ 8.30 (1998).
286. Romano, supmnote 82, at 55.
287. See KHURANA, supra note 136, at xiv (arguing investor capitalism has superseded
managerial capitalism and yet still faulting the search for executives as valuing charisma over
competence); Bainbridge, supra note 93, at 562-63 (arguing the recent trend of compensating
directors with stock has better aligned directors' interests with those of shareholders).
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harmed any more by a full inquiry into the propriety of decisions
relating to executive compensation than it is by an inquiry limited by
the dictates of the Rule when it is treated as either a presumption or a
standard of review. The Rule should not be at play in executive
compensation cases and other contexts in which the discovery process
does not threaten to compel disclosure of prospective business plans,
because, in such contexts, the Rule frustrates the purpose underlying
shareholder litigation: holding directors to account for their failure to
perform their fiduciary duties in a manner consistent with shareholder
interests.

